

# THE DECOLONIZATION QUESTION

*Kuan-Hsing Chen*

## Problematics

### *Rediscovering the culture of 'Ours'?*

This introductory chapter is a small theoretical exercise to trace selective episodes of responses to colonialism in the era immediately following the end of World War Two, essentially concerned with the problems *within* the (ex-)colonies, in order to situate the essays in the book. From the point of view of the history of a global decolonization movement (within which cultural studies has featured), the contemporary moment of the (ex-)colonies is still one of a process of decolonization, and in at least three connected but convolute forms: nationalism, nativism, and civilizationalism. All three of these forms have been endorsed but at the same time critically cautioned against by earlier analysts. Fanon's critique of nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s, during the peak points of the Third World independence movement, Memmi's questioning of nativism during the 1950s and 1960s, and Nandy's revitalization of a critical traditionalism (which I shall later describe as civilizationalism) some twenty years after the formation of India, are all connected to and emerged in response to what Young (1990) calls the West, what Sakai designates as 'the putative unity called the West' (1988: 477), or what Hall (1992) succinctly articulates as 'The West and the Rest'. But why, thirty or forty years later, are we (who live in the (ex-)colonized globe) still deeply shaped by the questions posed by our fore-runners in the critical tradition? Well, because of the neocolonial structure. We have been 'made' to identify with intellectual formulations coming from the (ex-)imperial centers, and hence have completely forgotten the powerful interventions made by Fanon, Memmi, or Nandy. A sad story. If we had 'listened' carefully to them, we might have been better placed not to continue making the same mistakes. It is never too late to listen though. The problem is whether we have the desire to reconnect to the discursive formulations so as to empower ourselves and others.

This desire to retrieve the forgotten tradition of 'cultural studies' as practiced and produced outside the imperial center also has its own conjuncture: it

happens in an intense moment of this so-called post-cold war era when all of us are forced to walk out of our own little disciplinary ghettos and geographical sites in order to more adequately respond to the questions of globalization and subsequent regionalization posed by the imperatives of transnational and global capitals. Under the fashionable sign, cultural studies, we might be able to get the necessary work done; at the same time, we might also be able to change the terrain of dominant cultural studies practices (which have run into a moment of crisis – depoliticization, dehistoricization and lack of sense of vision). The long term structural transformations from territorial colonialism to neocolonialism under the stamp of globalization signal the shifting gravity of capitalism. From Western Europe to the Atlantic and North America to the so-called Asia-Pacific, the entire Inter-Asia continent emerges as the forefront and site for political and economic struggles (I take special note of the rather unexpected coinage of the term, Inter-Asia, which is inspired by the establishment of the Inter-America Cultural Studies Network, to designate the linkage between North and Latin America). Throughout the Inter-Asia region, there is a weird sense of ‘triumphalism’ directed against the ‘West’, despite ‘internal’ antagonisms: the twenty-first century is ‘ours’; ‘we’ are finally centered. Wherever one is geographically positioned, there is an emerging, almost clichéd formula: ‘Asia is becoming the center of the earth and we are at the center of Asia, so we are the world.’ This is where history comes in. Contrary to the now fashionable claim that we have entered the postcolonial era, the mood of triumphalism as reaction and *reactionary* to colonialism indicates that we still operate within the boundary of colonial history which has generated a whole set of what I would call the colonial cultural imaginary in which all of us are caught up. Triumphalism, one must point out, can be a foundational desire, preparing for the coming of the next wave of imperial colonialism. My own concern with decolonizing the cultural imaginary can thus be located at this general level: unless the cultural imaginary we have been living with can be decolonized, the vicious circle of colonization, decolonization and recolonization will continue to move on.

Here, in this introductory chapter, as a continuing effort to push forward decolonization projects, a rather simple theoretical proposition is put forward: the history of colonial identifications has set limits on the boundaries of the local cultural imaginary, consciously or unconsciously articulated by and through the institutions of the nation-state, which in turn has shaped our psychic-political geography.

The intellectual trajectories and theoretical articulations that arrive at this understanding have by no means come out of the blue. Indeed, there exists a rich tradition of anti-colonial cultural discourse in the Inter-China context. The archetypes are Lu Xun’s famous early twentieth-century novels *The Story of A-Q* and *The Diary of the Mad Man*, which constitute an analysis of the self-hatred of a Chinese personality (until recently these texts had been prohibited from circulation in Taiwan due to Lu Xun’s leftist politics); and the Taiwanese

novelist Yang Quei's personal history documenting colonial encounters with the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s, which is an imaginative attempt to forge a class-based alliance across borders. Instead of tracing that line of thought, which requires even more space and time, I wish to link a set of discourses on colonial identifications. Not surprisingly, the central mediating figure here is Frantz Fanon. But to identify Fanon's problematic, we have to situate him within the polemical context against which he formulates his thesis; and in a later moment of colonial history, within which Fanon's formulation is elevated to other levels of abstraction. Therefore, I will begin within O. Mannoni, mediating through Fanon's articulation of 'colonial identification', and then move on re-read Fanon, Memmi, and Ashis Nandy in the light of the critique of nationalism, nativism and civilizationalism, in order to establish more viable positions, built on this critical tradition. It will become clear that, in positioning cultural studies as a decolonization movement which attempts to disarticulate the colonialist and imperialist cultural imaginaries that are still actively shaping our present, this chapter attempts to retrace an alternative trajectory of critical discourses generated 'outside' the imperial centers. The works of Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, and Ashis Nandy are re-read in terms of the problematic of colonial identifications which govern the space of the cultural imaginary. In locating the epistemic limits of these positions which emerged in different historical moments of decolonization, this chapter then turns to make a 'reconstructive' (rather than simply 'deconstructive') attempt by proposing critical syncretism as a political strategy (or ethics) that would enable us to move beyond the identity politics of multiculturalism (on an 'international' level – the logic of 'peaceful co-existence') and towards a utopian mode of 'postcolonial' identification or postcoloniality.

### *Cultural studies and/as decolonization*

Growing out of the histories of world-wide decolonization movements, cultural studies has become a major force continuing that critical intellectual tradition both within and outside academic contexts. Having persistently questioned cultural relations of power in local social formations for the past forty years, cultural studies is now undergoing a critical phase of internationalization. Such a transformation is occurring very much in response to the changing dispositions and structure of global forces such as the transnationalization of capital, the realignment of the nation-states into regional super-states in the so-called post-cold war era, as well as the implementation of the interconnected high tech systems such as satellites and the Internet which makes talking across borders more possible. To be sure, the umbrella term – globalization – constantly being used nowadays to describe the latest developments cannot be disconnected from the history of colonialism and neoimperialism, but is very much a product of it. It is increasingly felt and recognized by practitioners of cultural studies that local cultural production and consumption can no longer be adequately

placed and analyzed without linking it to the global circuits constituted by the long-term historical trajectories of geopolitics and neocolonial structures. A more collaborative, collective, and comparative intellectual practice may well be the possible mode of knowledge production to multiply the directions of knowledge flow, and to better understand the changing shape of the world, if interventions in the global-local dialectic can be more effectively inserted.

Epistemologically and politically, cultural studies is much more prepared than any other intellectual tradition to pursue this difficult task. Cultural studies, at least in the critical Althusserian-Gramscian-Foucauldian complex, has always recognized that 'theory' is not a universal set of formal propositions but an analytical weapon generated out of and in response to local-historical concerns. Cultural studies insists on understanding historical contingencies and local specificities. Therefore, it never pretends to a universality of cultural analysis and openly acknowledges the relative autonomy of cultures in different geopolitical locations. At the same time, the belief in producing organic intellectual work has put cultural studies in touch with the currents of social conflicts. Concerns of and interaction with social and political movements (anti-war, working class, subcultural, counter-cultural, women's, gays and lesbians, anti-racist, aboriginal, environmental, alternative media, national independence, etc.) have not only produced undeniable tensions which kept the energies of cultural studies alive, but forced cultural studies to recognize the 'common' structures of domination: capitalism, patriarchy, heterosexism, ethnocentrism, neocolonialism, etc. Although the specificities and intensities of oppression vary from place to place, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and class have been the central co-ordinating categories across geographical, national, and regional boundaries. Thus the critical vein of cultural studies has at least in discursive practices tried to maintain an internationalist spirit to combat the globalized multiple structures of domination together. In this sense, 'cultural studies', rather than modelling itself on traditional academic disciplines of the past, attempting to produce universal knowledge, can perhaps be more productively seen as an open-ended force field or a banner attempting to gather committed intellectuals to form an alternative international community to facilitate dialogues across national, sexual and racial/ethnic divides without sacrificing local trajectories.

The internationalization of cultural studies at this moment has been largely perceived as a new intellectual practice within the English speaking world, especially in the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, and perhaps less so in India, and even less so in the other English-speaking (ex-)colonies, such as South Africa, the Philippines, Singapore, and Hong Kong which in fact have for some time now engaged with the cultural studies project, not to mention the long tradition of cultural criticism in various sites which prepare the coming of the sign, cultural studies. Indeed, if one positions cultural studies as part of a global decolonization movement, obviously critical cultural analyses and practices have been going on in different parts of the non-English-speaking globe. To break existing structures of intellectual production and to build a wider

network of communities, there have been projects, which I have been noticing, in the hope that the too often unattainable cultural analyses done outside the dominant knowledge production systems can be made available within and outside the marginal sites, through established multinational publishing channels. Though some of the results can be charged as 'Asia-Pacific-centric', the attempt is consciously made not to reproduce a 'postcolonial' *resentment*.<sup>1</sup> I am fully aware of the danger of 'oceanic imagination',<sup>2</sup> the shift from the 'Atlantic' to the 'Pacific', which is part of the 'imperialist globalization'<sup>3</sup> project backed up by the Super State, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). But we should be careful not to essentialize the necessary belonging of the 'Asia-Pacific' to a postcolonialist and neoimperialist operation; doing so would give up the power of geographical imagination to the super states.

## Decolonization and its discontents

### *Marxism, identity politics and decolonization*

Increasingly, the politically relevant side of postcolonial studies has pushed us to the critical limit in its recognition that politics at this moment of history are about decolonization. Though there are tremendous problems with the current booming of a postcolonial cultural studies industry,<sup>4</sup> (problems which I call a trade off between 'diasporic opportunism and native collaborationism'),<sup>5</sup> important political gains can also be retrieved in it. Strongly put, if postcolonial cultural studies still has any political edge, it is to be found in 'decolonization' at different levels of abstraction and aiming at different axes of identity politics and different analytical sites. Much of the work done in the field has, however, concentrated on decolonizing the imperial centers. The seminal work of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, and the recent critical work such as Robert Young's (1990) *White Mythologies*, Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti's (1996) collection on *The Post-colonial Question* and Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay's (1996) edited volume on the *Questions of Cultural Identity*, have projected a necessary desire against 'Euro/America-Western-centrism'. Beyond recognizing the power of these critical interventions, one cannot but ask what happens to the ex-colonies outside the empires, especially the non-English ones? Stuart Hall, at the 1996 Tokyo conference, 'Dialogue with cultural studies', openly acknowledged the over-privileging of the English colonial experiences. Publication in the studies of colonialism in Japan, for instance, have been overwhelming in the post World War Two era;<sup>6</sup> it could be argued that the question of coloniality and postcoloniality has been the preoccupation of post-war Japanese intellectuals. And because of the hegemony of the English language and the controlled circulation of publication, none of these grounded historical-cultural works has been read in different parts of the world. Furthermore, the mainstream postcolonial movement seems to operate by means of a politics of forgetting (the past as well the 'rest' – the non-English

ones), as if something genuinely new has just been discovered. While the body of Fanon was over-emphasized, one forgets his predecessors Aimé Césaire and O. Mannoni, and his inheritors such as Albert Memmi and Ashis Nandy, and especially the earlier anti-colonial or even 'anti-westerncentric' figures in the Japanese, Indian, Korean and Chinese speaking contexts: Kawakami Hajime and later Maruyama Masao, Tagore, and later Gandhi/Nehru, Yi Tonghwi and Kim Myongsik, Lu Xun and Yang Kuei, among others; as if only the Euro-American writing tradition counts. In short, a whole body of anti-colonial discourses of decolonization generated outside the imperial metropolis, from the nineteenth century onwards, somehow has to be re-articulated to re-build the 'counter-colonial' tradition. This immensely important task is, of course, beyond the scope of this volume. But perhaps, refocusing on the decolonization question as the key site of postcolonial studies could signal a step forward.

It is probably fair to suggest that the intellectual umbrella under which a global decolonization movement could be initiated began with Marxism. For critical intellectuals in different parts of the world, the resources of thought and theoretical weapons did not simply come from the violence of colonial experiences, but also from the decolonization forces within the empire. I very much doubt there have been any other critical forces more influential than Marxism, both in terms of political practices and intellectual thought. The purpose here is definitely not to catalogue an inventory of the success and failure of Marxism, but to situate it within the long-term history of decolonization.

When European colonial imperialism reached its peak moment, partly triggered by the Industrial Revolution to outwardly expand capitalism, Marxism (in the founding moment of modern critical identity politics) 'discovered' capitalism and its historical agent for change – the working class. This naming itself presupposed an enunciative position 'outside' capitalism, in the name of socialism or communism. This future oriented politico-cultural imagination targeted a radical deconstruction of the empire by capturing its working logic and went further to posit a utopian blueprint. The presence of this alternative way of thinking and a desire for a different world slowly accumulated noises within the imperial center for the following century and a half. Half a century later, the Russian revolution of 1917 pushed forward the imagination. Marxist revolutionary theory, for the first time, had been 'proved' not to be a daydream, and injected hope into the decolonization forces within the centers of the capitalist world. And more importantly, Marxism offered anti-colonial movements in the colonies an alternative choice to capitalism. For better or worse, success or failure, most nationalist independence movements had to negotiate the Marxist seduction. Although the statist politics of the first and second internationals proved to be reproducing certain feudal elements of its parts (i.e., the rigid structure of hierarchy), the cultural imagination of an internationalism lingers on. To re-evoked the Russian revolution today is obviously ironical: from the competition between two systems, to the formation of the 'three worlds', to the end of the Cold War, the socialist-statist castles (Cuba, China, Vietnam, North

Korea, for instance) have been gradually sucked into the magnetic field of 'global capitalism'. How is this episode of history to be written? The easiest way is to erase the entire century, as if it never existed. But from a different point of view, just like imperialism, Marxism has not yet been sentenced to death: its critical elements have been saturated into different geographical sites, and can always be called upon to deal with difficult uncertainty. Simply put, the tradition of Marxism has established an imaginary discursive position 'outside' capitalism from which to critique internal logics of the latter; these decolonization forces appear and reappear through articulation to other elements in different temporary/spatial contexts. Perhaps, what is important is that, once one jumps out of the statist-nationalist socialism trap, that is, one no longer sees the capturing of state power as the ultimate goal; the sites of projection for Marxist desire become omnipresent, even minutely, though this understanding is only meaningful when decolonization is seen as a permanent silent revolution.

Let me emphasize here that, for at least a century now, Marxism can no longer be seen as something coming from the outside and has become part of the cultural subjectivity of intellectuals outside the imperial centers. To claim Marxism as the property of the West is just like claiming that technology belongs to the essentialist West. The reason Marxism survives is precisely its heterogeneity and its articulation to local intellectual histories.

On a theoretical level, the Marxism of the nineteenth century was never able to rid itself of its eurocentrism, but in effect generated a whole series of decentering movements to be followed even until now. Historical materialism, in its battle with idealism, radically historicized human social activities and institutions, and saw capitalism as a product of history and hence able to be superseded. On the other hand, it inherited the evolutionary view of history from the Enlightenment tradition, using the narrative of a universal proposition to cover the entire geographical spaces. It was precisely in this contradiction that universalism started to crack, beginning to loosen up the confidence of the Universal Subject. The birth of multiple resisting subjects of a micropolitics, gradually emerging on the historical platform, theorized a century later by the Foucauldian power/knowledge complex, was a necessary theoretical conclusion through a re-interpellation of Marxism mediating through Nietzsche. The whole series of 'epistemological breaks' was unstoppable: capitalist class, first world, male, whites, heterosexuals, etc. could not escape the fate of being decentered. Capitalism, World System, patriarchy, racism, heterosexual regimes were then constantly 'born', which generated exploding effects, just as when Freud 'discovered' the unconscious. To replace geopolitics, these parallel axes have been the historical trajectories of decolonization movements 'internal' to the imperial centers; but once, these trajectories of identity politics are linked to the emerging globalization movement, different forms of identity politics generate symbolic impacts and alliances and transcend geographical boundaries and national spaces, despite local differences. That the feminist and gay and lesbian, bisexual and transsexual movements (somehow parallel to the earlier

class movement of international communism) staged in the center-cores have generated global effects of decolonization are cases in point.

If, in the imperial centers, movements of class, gender/sexuality, and race/ethnicity have been the critical effects of decolonization, present in the form of identity politics, then outside the imperial centers, in the colonies and ex-colonies, the dominant practices of identity politics of decolonization have presented themselves in three interconnected forms: nationalism, nativism and civilizationalism. My central concern here is not to celebrate these decolonization moves; in recognizing the historical contingencies of the empowerment elements, I wish to pinpoint their critical limits so as to push the incomplete project of decolonization forward.<sup>7</sup>

Before entering into the key sites of the problems, let me briefly lay out my guiding lines of movement: the question of colonial identification (à la Fanon).

### *Re-reading Fanon's colonial identification*

#### *The story of colonial psychology: Mannoni*

In her fascinating PhD thesis, entitled 'Monsters and Revolutionaries: Colonial Family Romance and Métissage', Françoise Vérges argues that Fanon's 'decolonization of colonial psychology' has to be placed against a prior moment, that is, the French tradition of 'psychology of the people' of the nineteenth century. Its theoretical motives were to clarify the relationship between race, culture and psychology; its problematic was set in place to deal with the disorder of the 'dangerous classes': the working class, the poor peasantry and the vagabond. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the psychology of the people was expanded to the colony. To be brief, the epistemological foundation of colonial psychology was the political unconscious of the family romance: the relation between the child and its parents. The colonized subject was essentialized as poor in linguistic expression, and lacking the capacity of clear conceptualization; they believed in supernatural powers and fatalism; all their knowledge came from blind faith in their ancestors' superstition, and hence the native could not mature into an adult. Therefore the colonizer's mission was to guide them into a mature adult world. Of course, the entire formulation hid behind the name of 'science'; the validity of the psychologist's observation was built on the guarantee of scientific neutrality.

The rupturing point of a decolonization of colonial psychology, according to Vérges, was marked by the appearance of Octave Mannoni's *Prospero and Caliban: the Psychology of Colonization*, published in 1950, soon after World War Two. The turning point lies in Mannoni's bringing the colonizer into the picture of colonial relations, and starting to address the psychological condition of the previously covered-up 'master'. Unlike the colonial psychologist whose central concern was the colony where the researcher's enunciative position was an absent presence in the name of science, Mannoni's target is now the



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colonizer and presupposes a relation of mutually constituted subjectivity. From this point on, colonial 'relations' sharply come into the picture. Fanon's landmark text, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), further radicalizes psychoanalysis as a weapon for anti-colonial struggle. Albert Memmi's *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (1957), George Lamming's *The Pleasure of Exile* (1960), all the way to Ashis Nandy's *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (1983), and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o's *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (1986), have followed the problematic of the relations between the colonizer and the colonized, a problematic opened up by Mannoni. One could easily bash the theoretical dangers of binarism and essentialism in these works by evoking a sliding hybridity and performativity; but one might also run the danger of erasing historical antagonisms as motors of struggle. Once these categories (the colonizers and the colonized) are not taken as ontological and transcendental givens, the problematic remains useful as a beginning point to open up a historical space of imagination.

Re-reading Mannoni half a century later, one has to position his discourse symptomatically; it is as much a text of the psychology of colonization as a self-analysis of the colonizer. Even though he was obviously against colonial exploitation and racial discrimination, his enunciative position as a colonial information officer, who attempted to account for the 1947 anti-colonial revolt in which more than one hundred thousand Madagascans were killed, could not do away with the epistemic limits of eurocentrism. The borrowed Shakespearean figures, Prospero and Caliban, framed his entire analysis. The question to be posed is, why did the anatomy of the colonialist self happen at this particular moment? Perhaps Mannoni's attempt can be positioned within the wave of the postwar decolonization movement. Mannoni's analysis prepared the colonizer to face the anxiety of having to leave the colony; the uncertainty and the nostalgia for lost colonial privileges during a transitional period paved the way for Mannoni's courageous confrontation with the situation of the colonizer.

The central thrust of Mannoni's argument is that the psychology of colonization can be explained as an encounter between two types of distorted personalities: the colonizer's 'inferiority complex' and the 'dependency complex' of the colonized, which are mutually complementary. His explanatory baseline is founded on evolutionism, a universal history modeled on a person's life history and then mapped onto the entire world as different stages of personality development. After a child is born, the story goes, s/he slowly experiences his/her dependency on his/her parents; material conditions of existence, processes of socialization and affective development, etc., all form a dependency relation with the parents. A dependency complex is gradually formed. The turning point comes with anxiety and fear of being abandoned by the parents. On the one hand, this anxiety can lead to a more mature and autonomous personality, moving towards a rational individualistic mentality; on the other hand, it can also cultivate a lack of self-confidence, an inferiority

complex. The latter is then transformed into an abandonment of the parents; an unconscious form of repressed guilt which can be remedied by dominating others. According to Mannoni, the colonizers who were sent to the colony express this form of personality while the 'natives' remain still at the stage of the child's dependency complex. When they meet each other, it quickly becomes a symbiotic relationship.

Throughout the book, this founding narrative is constantly invoked to explain, for instance, the act of colonial revolt as anxiety at being abandoned, or the native's lack of gratitude toward the whites as a dependency complex. Even in its narrative closure, 'what is to be done', Mannoni proposes that political power should be handed over to the Fokon'olona, the tribal meeting, symbolizing the parents, so as to avoid the native's trauma of being abandoned.

Obviously, one does not have to argue about the eurocentric view of history in which Europe has reached its adulthood and the rest of the world remains childish, because to do this falls into a reductionist and evolutionary view of the singularity of history. One does not have to argue either about Mannoni's psychologizing moves to justify and explain away colonial domination. Once his simple picture of the children's history of development is challenged, Mannoni's explanatory framework crumbles.

#### *Fanon's colonial identification*

Prior to Fanon, Aimé Césaire angrily attacked Mannoni's eurocentric superiority in his *Discourse on Colonialism*,<sup>8</sup> a text that served as an inspiration for Fanon's intervention. If one reads Mannoni as a self-analysis of the colonialist personality, then Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* is the self-portrait of the colonized.<sup>9</sup> For Fanon, neither dependency complex nor inferiority complex is the essence of the colonial relation; both symptoms were imposed on the body of the colonized as a result of economic control and exploitation (1952: 11). Therefore, the alienation of the black cannot be reduced to the question of individual psychology; it is the social structure that conditions the collective psychoanalytic structure, hence, to use his words, 'the black man must wage his war on both levels' (ibid.: 11).

In the opening pages of *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon lays out his simple but enormously important 'discovery': 'At the risk of arousing the resentment of my colored brothers, I will say that the black is not a man' (ibid.: 8); 'The black man wants to be white' (ibid.: 9); 'Black men want to prove to white men, at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect' (ibid.: 10); 'For the black man there is only one destiny. And it is white' (ibid.: 10). The colonized wants to displace the colonizer, identifies with and wants to be 'him'. That is to say, the Black's 'proof' can only be validated through recognition by the whites. Fanon sees this demand of recognition as an impossible task, where a permanent crisis lies: the foundational logic of colonialism is racism, essentialized racialist differences which cannot be overcome, otherwise

there would be no colonialism. He says, 'I believe that the fact of the juxtaposition of the white and black races has created a massive psycho-existential complex. I hope by analyzing it to destroy it' (ibid.: 12). Language and sexual encounter become his sites of analysis.

To use contemporary language, the Fanonian problematic becomes: how is the black's colonized subjectivity formed? Why does the black skin have to wear white masks? In a four page footnote, Fanon explains, 'When one has grasped the mechanism described by Lacan, one can have no further doubt that the real Other for the white man is and will continue to be the black man – and conversely. Only for the white man The Other is perceived on the level of the body image, absolutely as the not-self – that is, the unidentifiable, the inassimilable. For the black man, as we have shown, historical and economic realities come into the picture' (ibid.: 161). The colonial history of economic domination has put the entire Symbolic Order in the hands of the white colonials; the defining agent of the ideological structure belongs to the colonizer. Although subjectivity is always mutually constituting, the position the whites occupy reduces and treats the black on the level of biological color; the bodily difference marks the boundary of the white subject. For the whites, this has nothing to do with history and economics, but is a 'universal' difference. Only when the black man leaves his body, and enters into the white Symbolic Order, can he become 'man'. The black's self-understanding is defined through the eyes of the whites; he is only a half-man, a partial subject; only by whitening himself, can he become man. In this structure of oneness, the defining agent himself is above categorization: 'white' is not colored, but above colors. This makes troublesome and challenging questions impossible to pose. Within this symbolic system, 'the negro symbolizes the biological'; he is phallus, athlete, boxer, military, animal, devil, etc. Wherever he goes, the black is black. Only by wearing a white mask, can he relieve his anxiety. Suffering a permanent lack, a permanent self-doubt, the black is permanently locked into the white jail.

Quite unlike Mannoni, Fanon proposes a more politically charged psychoanalysis. He argues, 'as a psychoanalyst, I should help my patient to become conscious of his unconscious and abandon his attempts at a hallucinatory whitening, but also to act in the direction of a change in the social structure' (ibid.: 100). To situate Fanon's proposal within the colonial context, one might ask: is it possible to insert his collective analysis into the public space under the colonial regime? It is obviously difficult. Does this difficulty suggest that cultural decolonization of the psychoanalytic sort is only possible after the collapse of the empire? Even with the departure of the colonizer, can a critical self-analysis possibly change the long-term implanted psychoanalytic structure? Is the colonial condition simply a racial divide based on economic differences? Fanon obviously realizes that there are multiple structures of domination; he argues, 'colonial racism is no different from any other racism,' and that 'All forms of exploitation are identical because all of them are applied against the same 'object' man' (ibid.: 88). Fanon's immediate concern is targeted at territorial

colonialism. But through analysis, he was forced to understand the existence of multiple structures of domination.

Fanon's discourse has been sharply criticized for his blind spots such as sexism and homophobia, but none of his critics is willing to abandon the problematic he opened up. In his hands, colonization has been reconfigured to refer to other domains of power, not just colonial racism. More recently, Diana Fuss, for instance, having attacked Fanon's homophobic stance, concludes,

When addressing the politics of identifications, Fanon fails to register fully the significance of the founding premise of his own theory of colonial relations, which holds that the political is located within the psychical as a powerful shaping force. I take this working premise to be one of Fanon's most important contributions to political thought – the critical notion that the psychical operates precisely as a political formation. Fanon's work also draws our attention to the historical and social conditions of identification. It reminds us that identification is never outside or prior to politics, that identification is always inscribed within a certain history: identification names not only the history of the subject but the subject in history. What Fanon gives us, in the end, is a politics that does not oppose the psychical but fundamentally presupposes it.

(Fuss, 1994: 39)

In a way, 'colonization' as well as 'colonial identification' after Fanon no longer simply refer to racial divides. The emergence of identity politics (gender, sexuality, ethnicity, even class) in the post-war era can be understood as a Fanonian problematic.

Fanon's analysis was done right after the end of World War Two, within the mood of Third World national independence movements, which Fanon's later work helped to facilitate. After the withdrawal of the colonial master, after national independence, has a psychoanalysis of decolonization reached the end of its life?

### *Nationalism in Question*

Algeria declared its independence in 1962. Fanon had participated in the revolution since the mid 1950s; before his death in 1961, he published his most influential work, *The Wretched of the Earth*. Participation in the process of the movement made him see the next wave of the problem. In the chapter on 'The Pitfalls of National Consciousness', Fanon painfully forecasts the problem: the colonizer leaves the previous colonial structure of relation unchanged; it 'puts on the mask of neo-colonialism' (1963: 152). 'If it [nationalism] is not enriched and deepened by a very rapid transformation into a consciousness of social and political needs, in other words into humanism, it leads up a blind alley' (ibid.:

204). When the colonizers are ready to go, they hand the regime to the 'native' bourgeois elites, who have identified with and internalized the culture of the colonial power, so as to maintain new colonial linkages to control the ex-colonies.

Predicated on the inside/outside metaphor or, to use Fanon's expression, Manichean divide, colonialism driven by the forces of capital established in the process of its expansion the structure of the nation-state as its mediating agent to unify internal differences *vis-à-vis* outside colonizers. Once the system of the nation-state was established and imposed on the globe, the most visible methods of evacuating the outsiders/colonizers were the nation-building and state-making projects. Third world nationalism, as a response and reaction to colonialism, was therefore seen as a necessary choice to signal autonomy from outside forces. With territories divided by the colonial powers throughout Africa, Latin America, and Asia, colonialist governments saw the rise of nationalist independence movements not so much as a threat but as a means to reduce their costs, meanwhile maintaining colonial linkages in trade and political influence. As Ashis Nandy succinctly puts it,

In Manchuria, Japan consistently lost money, and for many years colonial Indochina, Algeria and Angola, instead of increasing the political power of France and Portugal, sapped it. This did not make Manchuria, Indochina, Algeria or Angola less of a colony. Nor did it disprove that economic gain and political power are important *motives* for creating a colonial situation. It only showed that colonialism could be characterized by the search for economic and political advantage without concomitant real economic and political gains, and sometimes even economic or political losses.

(1983: 1)

To let colonies go then was the way to get to rid of the responsibilities but not the advantages of colonialism. 'Self-determination', a slogan heralded by younger generation colonial powers, proved to be not so much a humanist concern, but a political strategy to scramble up the already occupied territories in order to take a larger piece of the cake for 'national interests'. J.A. Hobson, as early as 1902, had discovered a close linkage between nationalism and imperialism, in that the latter cannot function without the former. By the 1940s, it had become clear that neoimperial nationalism was in good shape. Aimé Césaire's intuitive statement at that time was a warning to Third World intellectuals:

I know that some of you, disgusted with Europe, with all that hideous mess which you did not witness by choice, are turning – oh! in no great numbers – toward America and getting used to looking upon that country as a possible liberator.

'What a godsend!' you think.

'The bulldozers! The massive investment of capital! The roads! The ports!'

'But American racism!'

'So what? European racism in the colonies has inured us to it!'

And there we are, ready to turn the great Yankee risk.

So, once again, be careful!

American domination – the only domination from which one never recovers. I mean from which one never recovers unscarred.

(Césaire, 1950/1972)

Here Césaire had already pointed to the transition from colonialism to neo-imperialism, from territorial acquisition to 'remote control'. But for the sake of power, third world nationalists did not seem to be bothered by the gradual formation of US hegemony, and still struggled for state independence with US military and financial 'help'. And the nation-state structure, finally implemented everywhere, proved to be the part of the neocolonial system. With no better choice, to counter an offensive nationalist-based colonialism, a defensive nationalism became the only unifying force opposing the colonizer.

In recognizing the almost inevitable historical necessity, one should not lose sight of the problems which come with nationalism. Shaped by the immanent logic of colonialism, Third World nationalism could not escape from reproducing racial and ethnic discrimination; a price to be paid by the colonizer as well as the colonized selves. Fanon identified the problem in 1961, 'From nationalism we have passed to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism'; 'We observe a permanent seesaw between African unity, which fades quicker and quicker into the mists of oblivion, and a heartbreaking return to chauvinism in its most bitter and detestable form' (Fanon, 1968: 156–7). Furthermore, the ruling elites, in their struggle over state power to replace the colonial regime, have mobilized the pre-existing ethnic differences to their advantage, and ethnic essentialism has been the easy way out. It is then understandable that ethnic nationalism since the post war era has dominated Third World politics, a reproduction of colonialism of the earlier moment. How true was Fanon's critique of nationalism?

Twenty-five years later, in 1985, *The South* and Vienna's Center for Development co-organized a conference, 'Decolonization and After – The Future of the Third World', to review the diverse practices and experiences of decolonization, forty years after national independence movements. Altaf Gauhar, a Pakistani writer and the editor of *The South* and of the *Third World Quarterly*, summarizes the situation in this by now often cited passage:

It did not take long for the people to discover that all that had been changed was the colour of their masters . . . independence brought little change and they remained chained to the same British-style institutions which the ruling elites manipulated and controlled to

perpetuate their own advantages . . . For the masses the achievement of independence was the end of their struggle and also the end of their dreams . . . nationalism could not serve either as a cover to conceal economic and social disparities nor hold back the tides of regional autonomous pressures . . . when cultural homogeneity and truly national consciousness failed to evolve, people began to revert to the security of their traditional parochial and class identities . . . The seeds of disintegration in the sub-continent [of India] were all sown in the colonial period. They are now coming to bitter fruition.

(Gauhar, 1987, cited in Kreisky and Gauhar, 1987: 4-5)

This passage coming from the Third World by no means expresses a nostalgia towards the colonial regime nor aims to legitimate the history of colonialism, but it puts a sharp focus on what has happened since the foreign power finally left. 'Internal colonialism' began, with essentially the same logic as 'external colonialism'. As Nandy forcefully put it, 'the rhetoric of progress uses the fact of internal colonialism to subvert the cultures of societies subject to external colonialism', and 'the internal colonialism in turn uses the fact of external threat to legitimize and perpetuate itself', but one has to understand that 'neither form of oppression can be eliminated without eliminating the other' (Nandy, 1983: xii). The inside/outside metaphor becomes the alibi for the national bourgeoisie to continue colonial ruling, and has thus put us in a position to question the legitimacy of using color, racial and ethnic distinctions to justify any form of nationalist governmentality.

### *Nativism*

Right before and after national independence, nationalism has generated a by-product: nativism. If, for centuries, colonialism has carried out a 'civilizing mission' to remove 'backward' local tradition, and replace it with more 'advanced' modernization programs on every front, then the anti-colonial, national independence movement could no longer trust anything coming from the side of the colonial devils. A 'self-discovery movement' was called upon to discover our uncontaminated self and authentic tradition, to replace the deeply invaded colonial imagination. If, to juxtapose Fanon with Nandy, colonialism works by the mechanism of identification, through aggression and establishing the colonizer as the figure of modernity, to bind colonizer and the colonized together, then nativism works by an identification with 'the self'. Defined in relation to the 'non-native' colonial master, 'nativism' operates on every level of social formation. The official posts have first to be nativized; followed by changes of national flag and dress, the language, the curriculum, the textbooks, food, etc., though at gut level, colonial elements still permeate and could not be vacuum-cleaned overnight. And in fact, the colonial imagination has permeated the native's body and thought. Albert Memmi documented and

analyzed this nativist 'self-discovery movement' so well in the last two chapters of his rather neglected seminal work, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (1957), published five years later than Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, and four years before *The Wretched of the Earth*. Listen to Memmi: 'We then witness a reversal of terms. Assimilation being abandoned, the colonized's liberation must be carried out through a recovery of the self and of autonomous dignity. Attempts at imitating the colonizer required self-denial; the colonizer's rejection is the indispensable prelude to self-discovery' (1957: 128). Thus, from the very beginning of nativist decolonization, the colonizer is the key initiator. Once the movement starts, 'everything that belongs to the colonizer is not appropriate for the colonized . . . the rebellious colonized begins by accepting himself as something negative' (ibid.: 138). The colonized then will choose to destroy anything built by the colonizer. As Memmi saw it, for the nativization movement activist, 'The important thing now is to rebuild his people, whatever be their authentic nature; to reform their unity, communicate with it and to feel that they belong . . . he is even more ardent in asserting himself as he tries to assume the identity of the colonizer' (1965: 135); 'by taking up the challenge of exclusion, the colonized accepts being separate and different, but his individuality is that which is limited and defined by the colonizer. Thus, he embodies religion and tradition, ineptitude for technology of a special nature which we call Eastern, etc.' (ibid.: 136). To the colonialist category of the East and West, one could add Confucianism, the Culture of the Continent vs the Culture of the Sea. Desperately seeking essentialist differences constitutes the foundational, if not fundamentalist, drive of nativism.

In short, if Fanon's critique of nationalism was ahead of its time, then we still live under the shadow of Memmi's critique of nativism.

The rediscovery of the self in is no way bounded by the nation-state. It can go in any direction where a tradition of 'difference' (from the colonizer) can be discovered. The contemporary movement of 'Asianization' (against the 'West') of Asia, 'Africanization' of Africa (again, against the 'Western' hegemony), or even 'Europeanization' (against 'America') of Europe can be accounted for as a nativist move. The assertion and reclaiming of Asian, African or European values and of an Asian, African or European identity are not necessarily nationalist interpellation, but part of the nativist imagination.

### *Civilizationalism: East and West as colonial categories*

The rediscovery of the self serves the function of empowering colonized subjects. However, a new form of 'empowerment' seems to emerge, slightly divergent from the nativist movement. One of the most powerful articulations recently emerging in the historical scene is civilizationalism. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that, the most influential academic essay of the 1990s has been Samuel Huntington's (1993) 'Clash of Civilizations'. For better or worse, the US right wing imperialist stand taken by Huntington has drawn responses



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from all over the world; throughout the continent of Asia, essays, conferences, books, policy consultations, etc., have been generated within (rather than outside) the Huntington problematic. The simple division of the globe into seven or eight symbolic spaces has in effect constructed a new civilizational identification which everyone on earth is forced to take on. Huntington's proposal to US state power, at the end of his essay, seeks to exploit conflicts so as to maintain world hegemony, which will no doubt, if state machines are brought into the Huntington problematic (which seems to be the case in practice), generate global racism, nationalism, and regionalism, not to mention reactionary civilizationalism.

In sharp contrast to the colonizer's strategic mapping, the most articulate form of civilizationalism formulated by intellectuals in the (ex-)colonized societies, as far as I know, comes from the Delhi-based, prominent social psychologist, Ashis Nandy. In his recent book, *The Illegitimacy of Nationalism: Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Self* (1994), Nandy argues that nationalism is a by-product of Western colonialism, and hence illegitimate; according to his reading of Tagore and Gandhi,

the fear of nationalism grew out of their experience of the record of anti-imperialism in India, and their attempt to link their concepts of Indianness with their understanding of a world where the language of progress had already established complete dominance. They did not want their society to be caught in a situation where the idea of the Indian nation would supersede that of the Indian civilization, and where the actual ways of life of Indians would be assessed solely in terms of the needs of an imaginary nation-state called India. They did not want the Indic civilization and lifestyle, to protect which the idea of the nation-state had supposedly been imported, to become pliable targets of social engineering guided by a theory of progress which, years later, made the economist Joan Robinson remark that the only thing that was worse than being colonized was not being colonized.

(Nandy 1994: 3)

In other words, if Indian nationalism works on the level of the nation-state, civilizationalism operates in the larger historical space of Hindu civilization, which functions to resist being trapped into the colonial system of the nation-state. Nandy's articulation was actually grounded in his earlier seminal work, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (1983), which was a self-conscious theoretical undertaking in the tradition of Fanon and Memmi.<sup>10</sup> In Nandy's work, in contrast to the aggressiveness of Huntington's proposal, what he calls 'an unheroic but critical traditionalism' contributes 'to that stream of critical consciousness: the tradition of reinterpretation of traditions to create new traditions' (1983: xvii-xviii). Tradition, and its reinterpretation, then becomes the empowering ground on which the long-lasting cultural impacts of

Western colonialism can be combatted, because 'The West is now everywhere, within the West and outside; in structures and in minds' (ibid.: xi).

Although the differences between the offensive right-wing colonialist Huntington and the critical left-wing traditionalist populist Nandy are clear enough, the civilizationalist interpellation has to be carefully cautioned against.<sup>11</sup> The Huntington–Nandy articulation discloses a wider structure of feeling, a cultural imaginary, not limited to the Indian or US case. It perhaps projects an emerging realization in the so-called postcolonial context. That is, for the (ex-) colonized, nationalism is no longer the panacea, once magnified into global capitalism, the hierarchical structure of the nation-state more or less continuing the established order of colonialism with which one could not compete with its forerunners; at this moment, perhaps only by bringing out a 'higher' and 'larger' category, civilization, could seal the unsealable scar. In inventing and reinventing signs familiar to the popular imaginary and then articulating them as a higher form of universalism, the ex-colonized regains confidence in civilization, and thereby 'at least' beats the West in terms of cultural imagination. This is a perhaps one form of psychoanalytic identification of the 'postcolonial' imagination.

As I said, the discourse of civilizationalism has wider ramifications; such articulation also exists in recent expressions like 'cultural China' and even 'orientalism'. In a way, the signs of 'China', 'India', 'Islam', 'the Orient' are not necessarily nationalist concepts, but emotional signifiers; to reclaim 'a five thousand year history or four thousand' is once again a reaction and response to, shall we say, 'post' colonialism; it does not have concrete substance, but enables the scared subject to feel that it can reside more safely in a world full of cultural identity crises. The danger here is of course that these so-called non-Western big civilizations might fall into the logic of colonial competition and in a struggle over representing the Other of the West, to occupy the space of the non-West. A reproduction of ethnocentrism in structure? Isn't the center still the opposing West? Isn't there an exclusionary practice? Isn't the appearance of the 'North/South' divide, beyond political-economic levels, expressing a symptom on the psychoanalytic account? Surrounding these big civilizations, how are the little subjectivities which do not have an idea of a larger 'civilization' to hang onto, or are forced into an identification proposed by Huntington, to project their destinies and address their feeling of marginalization? Let us read Sri Lankan anthropologist S.J. Tambiah's articulation of what I call the 'little subjectivity' complex:

Notwithstanding their genial qualities, Sri Lankans are also apt to be proud and arrogant abroad: they feel superior to the Indians, the Malays, the Chinese, perhaps even the Japanese. For their eyes are set on the West, particularly Great Britain, which was their colonial ruler from the early nineteenth century until 1948. They are proud of their British veneer: their elites acculturated more quickly than their

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Indian counterparts; their island enjoyed a prosperity owing to its plantation economy that was the envy of its Asian neighbors; and the British raj established a school system and a transportation system that, because of the island's size, was more efficient than any could possibly be in the vast subcontinent of India. And therefore, although India is undeniably their parent in many ways, all indigenous Sri Lankans – Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim – become visibly annoyed, if not outraged, if Sri Lanka is mistaken physically to be part of India (as many people in distant parts of the world innocently do), or if it is thought culturally to be part of 'greater India' (as some Indians patronizingly do).

(Tambiah, 1986: 2)

The cultural psychology Tambiah portrays reveals a general complex or sentiment of civilizationalism and little subjectivities that is only unique in its specificity. It also resonates in other geocolonial relations, if for example one replaces the term Sri Lanka with Taiwan or Canada, India with China or the US. What I am getting at is that the Huntington interpellation has historical-psychic support. The real danger is if Huntington's US imperialist articulation, to interpellate 'civilizationalist' identity, is really an 'upgraded' imperial nationalism.<sup>12</sup> The Huntington Clash has already generated enormous antagonism from China and Southeast Asia; but, as far as I can tell, all the nationalist-civilizationalist reactions have been sucked into his framing rather than challenging the framework as a whole.<sup>13</sup> Those geographical spaces with no clear belonging to the bigger civilizations are now forced to take sides and are boxed in by the Huntington categories. Sites where there is potential to be more syncretically hybrid might change their directions. Australia used to claim to be 'a multicultural nation in Asia'; but with a conservative government in power, the state identification has shifted toward a multicultural 'Western' nation in Asia.

What about the centrifugal core of magnetic field? The West is also an emotional signifier. More precisely, behind the West hides also a racist concept, white; the West contains no unity except color. Just like the East, at best it refers to another form of civilization; its floating signified changed historically according to the transformation of hegemonic positions: from Dutch and Spain, through the British and French Empires, to US neoimperialism. Doesn't 'The fall of the West' and the subsequent claim that 'the twenty-first century is x's century' project a 'postcolonial' desire?

### *Watch out for the Politics of Resentment!*

If the cultural basis of colonialism was racism, and it generated an identification with the aggressor/colonizer, then one can say that the cultural basis of neo-colonialism is multiculturalism. Multiculturalism recognizes differences but

covers up ethnicity/race/nationality as the nodal point of division, and generates an identification with the self in the form of nativism and identity politics.

What reconnects and unifies nationalism, nativism, and civilizationalism is what Memmi calls, to use psychoanalytic language, 'resentment', which binds the (ex-)colonizer and the (ex-)colonized together. As I argued earlier, the inside/outside, self/other logic of colonialism lingers on in these three forms of decolonization, and a constant resentment against the (past or present) colonial outsider and/or the imaginary other is still at work, expressing itself in the form of racism. Memmi argues, 'though xenophobia and racism of the colonized undoubtedly contain enormous *resentment* and are a negative force, they could be the prelude to a positive movement, the regaining of self-control by the colonized' (Memmi, 1965: 132; my emphasis). We surely hope Memmi is right that we could eventually leave the negative force, but the dominant historical conditions do not seem to take us beyond resentment. Nationalism is on the rise, nativism still prevails, and civilizationalism begins to find a fully-fleshed life. Examining the 'global politics of resentment' at the present moment, one must acknowledge that Memmi's 1957 account of the 'self-rediscovery' movement in the context of Tunisia remains suggestive: we have not entered the postcolonial era, but are still trapped in colonial history.

If it is only by identification with strong signs (e.g. hoping to belong to a strong nation-state, or to an ethnic group in power) that one can relieve the anxiety of the subject's multiple splits, one has not in fact touched the core of the contemporary crisis; perhaps an understanding of the composition of the historical self is the starting point of relieving such a crisis. If one sees the subject as a site of hybridization, then only through a concrete projection of desire can one clarify the formation of subjectivity. Hybridity in this sense cannot be understood simply as an interaction and meeting of different races to decompose its form of articulation. It could mean the hybridization of the past and present, of forces pulled through by feudal and capitalistic modes of production, the intersection of cultures generated out of different geographical space. These cultural elements do not simply operate on the body of the subject; the very form of their articulation becomes extremely complex.

### **Imagining the 'postcolonial' way out: critical syncretism**

Under such saturating (psychic) moods of resentment, how does one begin to develop possible cultural strategies to confront the situation?

#### *Contesting multiculturalism and 'hybridity'*

Assimilation, as the archetype of a colonial cultural imagination, has proved to be an oppressive, violent, and impossible operation. Is multiculturalism then the alternative? Multiculturalism has been formulated and practiced in different

places with different names: for instance, in the US, it is called multiculturalism, in Singapore, multiracialism (see Chapter 9); in the Chinese Republic, the co-existence of five nations; and in Taiwan, the 'big four ethnicities'. Perhaps the most 'advanced' and 'progressive' form of multiculturalism can be said to be practiced in places such as Australia. But even in the most advanced instances, there are still lessons to be learned. Ghassan Hage, a Sydney University-based anthropologist of culture, has succinctly pointed out, multiculturalism, as is practiced in the dominant Anglo-Celtic nationalist-Republican discourse, is in effect a collection of other cultures deployed for national if not nationalist window shopping. '[T]his exhibitionary multiculturalism is the postcolonial version of the colonial fair' (1993: 133). For Hage, that multicultural policy 'allows' others to 'maintain their cultures' does not mean that it is 'not a fantasy of total control' (ibid.: 135). 'Multicultural language in this regard is merely moving along with the language of zoology' (ibid.); like zoology, the system of multicultural language classifies others, constructs hierarchical orders, and as if in the zoo, minorities are displayed as rare animals. 'All ethnic cultures within the Anglo-Celtic multicultural collection are imagined as dead cultures that cannot have a life of their own except through the "peaceful co-existence" that regulates the collection' (ibid.: 133). In short, 'if the exhibition of the "exotic natives" was the product of the relation of power between the colonizer and the colonized in the colonies as it came to exist in the colonial era, the multicultural exhibition is the product of the relation of power between the postcolonial powers and the postcolonized as it developed in the metropolis following the migratory processes that characterized the postcolonial era' (ibid.).

To reformulate Hage's theoretical articulation at a general level: if the cultural basis of colonialism is racism, and its cultural strategy, assimilation, which generates an identification with the aggressor/colonizer, then can one say that the cultural basis of neocolonialism is multiculturalism (which recognizes differences but covers its dominant ethnic position as the nodal point of divide), and its cultural strategy, peaceful co-existence, and which generates an identification with the self in the form of nativism, civilizationalism and identity politics. The direction of an incomplete project of decolonization is then to interiorize others in a highly self-conscious manner; here 'others' are not simply racial, ethnic and national categories, but also class, sex/gender and geographical positionings; the highly structured hierarchy of differences has to be transcended through interaction, understanding and changes of objective conditions.

Colonialism is an imposed structure. From 1492 onward for four centuries, it radically transformed the world. The political epistemology of colonialism builds itself on a rigid 'inside/outside' distinction, and the main axes have been race and ethnicity: color, language, accent, religion, etc., mark the divide between the colonizer and the colonized; these are also cultural categories which mark hierarchies and unequal power relations. Sex, age and class in

colonial relations were often metaphorized: colonizers are male adults with higher class positions, while the colonized were seen as women, and/or children with lower class status. Decolonization movements have deepened the understanding that an inversion of colonialism, a continuation of imposed colonial modes of thinking and categories turned upside down, would not answer. The political epistemology of decolonization could no longer put priority on race and ethnicity under which sexual, age and class differences are subsumed. Recognition of differences, erasing the hierarchical structure of differences, and interiorizing differences are the principle of its political ethics. To put it simply, decolonization is a permanent struggle against any form of domination.

Ghassan Hage's insight pushes us to question the structural enunciative positions of the state apparatus, the power bloc, and the dominant culture in their handling of the problems of identity crisis: one might have good intentions but still generate the next wave of (neo)colonial domination. If that is the case, where can subaltern subjects go?

The fashionable wing of postcolonial theory proposes the concept and strategy of hybridity, partly developed out of the work of Fanon. In Homi Bhabha's hands, hybridity is not simply a descriptive concept, denoting the effects of the hybridization of different cultures in a colonial context; it also points to a strategy of resistance, especially in notions such as ambivalence. Its discursive level moves through cultural forms, colonial conditions, subjectivities, forms of resistance, and even to the level of political strategy and ethics.

In his article 'Signs taken for wonders', Bhabha (1994) attempts to re-read the historical records of an event which happened in Delhi around May 1817, using the concept of hybridity to capture the form of the struggle against colonial authority. Inheriting the Fanonian tradition of recognition as a practice of identification, Bhabha puts it this way,

colonial hybridity is not a problem of genealogy or identity between two different cultures which can then be resolved as an issue of cultural relativism. Hybridity is a problematic of colonial representation and individuation that reverses the effects of the colonialist disavowal, so that other 'denied' knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority – its rules of recognition. . . . Hybridity reverses the formal process of disavowal so that the violent dislocation of the act of colonization becomes the conditionality of colonial discourse.

(1994: 114)

What Bhabha is getting at is that the exercise of colonial power produces the effects of hybridity; here, the effect cannot be understood as it used to be as being only monopolized by the colonizer, while the entire cultural tradition of the colonized was silenced. In fact, the colonized was 'more' hybrid than the colonizer in that 'he' has acquired the language, the accent and forms of

expression of the dominant; although the colonizer looks down on 'him', the latter can still use the colonizer's language to insert denied knowledges and traditions into the dominant discursive space, and in turn, the colonizer's unfamiliarity with this whole set of cultural codes puts the colonizer in crisis, and hence undoes his authority; this anxiety is nothing but a form of recognition. In this sense, the effects of hybridity are always ambivalent. On the one hand, the colonized operates within a colonial system of representation and always reproduces a pre-existing frame of relations. On the other hand, the colonized 'politely' contests the colonizer even when not being noticed by the latter.

In his article, 'The postcolonial and the postmodern', Bhabha (1994) points out further,

The postcolonial perspective . . . attempts to revise those nationalist or 'nativist' pedagogies that set up the relation of Third World and First World in a binary structure of opposition. The postcolonial perspective resists the attempt at holistic forms of social explanation. It forces a recognition of the more complex cultural and political boundaries that exist on the cusp of these often opposed political spheres. It is from this hybrid location of cultural value - the transnational as the translational - that the postcolonial intellectual attempts to elaborate a historical and literary project. My growing conviction has been that the encounters and negotiations of differential meanings and values within 'colonial' textuality, its governmental discourses and cultural practices, have anticipated, *avant la lettre*, many of the problematics of signification and judgement that have become current in contemporary theory - aporia, ambivalence, indeterminacy, the question of discursive closure, the threat to agency, the status of intentionality, the challenge to 'totalizing' concepts, to name but a few.

(1994: 173)

Here Bhabha not only displays his poststructuralist rhetoric but also reveals his subject positions: diaspora, transnational, postmodern, post-Freudian, etc. While colonialism in the process of dissemination becomes infinitely indeterminate: 'Yes, but . . .' becomes the standard formula. Robert Young (1990) has produced a more substantial critique of Bhabha's work, which we do not have to rehearse here. For my purposes, I only want to make two points. First, to catch colonial flashes through the poststructural eye, Bhabha radically de-historicizes his analytical objects. Colonial conditions however cannot stand still. Has the 'hybridity' phenomenon of 1817 continued to move on until now? What are the differences between then, and the present? Under what conditions could hybridity work differently? From Mannoni, Fanon, and Nandy, we have seen the emergence of a different problematic to confront a new structural condition: objects and mechanisms of identification configured as conditions

shift from the colonial moment to that of pre-independence, to post-independence. To isolate and slice out hybridity as a trans-historical figure runs the risk of an ahistorical and positivistic trap. Second, as an analytical concept, hybridity, operating on different levels of abstraction, has lost its theoretical positioning and diffused its critical function; just as the notion of mimicry has been operating as a descriptive as well as a strategy of resistance. More seriously, hybridity presupposes purity, something which is not hybrid. The encounter of two 'pure' cultures produces hybridity. Does that mean the uncontaminated, original culture has never been 'contaminated' by and mixed with cultural forces coming from the 'outside'? Which culture is not then hybrid? Paul Gilroy (1994) argues, 'the idea of hybridity, of intermixture, presupposes two anterior purities . . . I think there isn't any purity; there isn't any anterior purity . . . that's why I try not to use the word hybrid, because there are degrees of it, and there are different mixes. . . . Cultural production is not like mixing cocktails . . .' (1994: 54-5). To displace hybridity, Gilroy proposes that, 'What people call hybridity, what I used to call syncretism. I think I would prefer to stick with that – syncretism is the norm, but that dry anthropological word does not have any poetic charge of it. There isn't any purity: Who the fuck wants purity? Where purity is called for I get suspicious' (ibid.: 54).

*The reconstruction of subjectivity: for a critical syncretism*

In fact, syncretism is not necessarily an anthropological concept to describe processes of interactions between races; in religious studies and intellectual history, syncretism has been an important analytical concept. In *Chiao Hung and the Restructuring of Neo-Confucianism in the Late Ming* (1986), Edward T. Ch'ien deploys this concept as central to his explanation of the emergence of a syncretic consciousness to mix elements of Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism to combat the orthodoxy of the dominant neo-Confucian school. According to Ch'ien, in Chiao Hung's mode of thinking, the three religions no longer maintain a relation of peaceful co-existence and compartmentalization; instead, they 'intermix' (1986: 15), they were 'mutually explanatory and illuminating' (ibid.: 14). On a theoretical level, for Ch'ien, syncretism not only emphasizes the process of mixing, but also indicates a much more active consciousness to justify this process (ibid.: 2). Therefore, according to him, syncretism implies the active participation of the involved subjects: the practices of the subject are not imposed upon and operate on an unconscious basis, but are self-reflexive processes that engage the interlocutors.

In this framework, the constitution of subjectivity is composed of three historically grounded sites of interaction and interarticulation: body (*sheng*), mind (*shing*) and desire (*chih*) – the well-known Chinese philosophical cosmology. This reformulation echoes Deleuze-Guattari's new social ontology. Individual and cultural subjectivities operate on these three historically constituted axes.



Unless these three elements are liberated simultaneously, subjectivity remains 'colonized', in the wider sense of the word.

Here I want to borrow and insert Ch'ien's concept of syncretism into the level of the ethics of decolonization, and give it a critical turn, so as to form an alternative cultural imaginary which breaks with colonial identification. I shall call it a critical syncretism. The key question here is the object of identification: the formation of colonized subjectivity has always been passive, reactive and imposed, and the colonizer has been its object of identification. In the decolonization movement, nativism and identity politics shift the object of identification towards the self. This can also be seen as a reaction against or a disidentification with the colonizer although it presents itself as a multicultural or multiple subject. To break away from the frame of colonial identification, a decolonization movement has to move on, actively searching out multiple objects of identification. The critical question becomes: who and what are the objects? If a critical syncretism presupposes a subject position, a position emerging from a history of left-wing decolonization movements, what could be its objects of identification?

To put it simply and bluntly, the bottom line of a critical syncretism is becoming others, to actively interiorize elements of others into the subjectivity of the self so as to move beyond the boundaries and divisive positions historically constructed by colonial power relations, patriarchy, capitalism, racism, chauvinism, heterosexism, nationalistic xenophobia, etc. Edward Said has argued, 'Imperialism consolidated the mixture of cultures and identities on a global scale. But its worst and most paradoxical gift was to allow people to believe that they were only, mainly, exclusively, white, or black, or Western, or Oriental' (1993: 336). The question, perhaps, is not simply and only, to break these ethnically, nationally, and geographically defined boundaries, but more actively, with what sort of specific subjects could one identify? The male chauvinist Oriental? Upper-class privileged whites? African governing elites who kill their own human right activists? Or the transnational corporate hybrid subject who rips off all the poor labor on earth? Certainly not. My own caution against the call for transnationalism in cultural studies is precisely that once we move out of the national boundaries, with whom could we connect? To what subjects could we devote our energies and project our own desires?

Imperialism has indeed produced hybrid subjectivities which made the 'return' to an uncontaminated self impossible. Imperialism has also pushed the world structure into globalization which deepens the 'hybridity' of the already hybrid subject. The flow of capital, of population, of cultural identity, etc. seems to be irresistible. Confronting the pressure of globalization, national-ethnic identity has undoubtedly emerged at this moment of history as a privileged problem as a result of heavy trafficking and interactions. In this process, national identity has been constructed as the main axis of identification. Where are you from? How long are you going to stay here? When are you going back to your country? Global bureaucracy, through the universal apparatus of ID cards and passports, constructs one's identity according to the

nation-state one belongs to. In the essay, 'The Question of Cultural Identity,' Stuart Hall pinpoints the contradictory effects of globalization:

- 1 cultural homogeneity and the global-postmodern breaks down national identity.
- 2 resistance to globalization has deepened national and local identity.
- 3 national identity is in decline, but new forms of hybrid identity are gaining their positions.

(Hall, 1992)

Hall's first proposition is indeed happening. The autonomy of sovereignty and territory has been challenged by the flow of capital, technology and population. But the second proposition is also happening: the global rise of nationalism is in part a response to the formation of global capital. Renato Constantino, the Filipino historian, has argued that postwar nationalist movements should be transformed into combat against neocolonialism on an economic level:

In the past, the nationalist struggle focused on political independence. Nationalism expressed the opposition of the subject people to national oppression, namely the political rule of their colonizers. Today, national oppression still exists. It consists of the economic domination of former colonies by transnational corporations of the advanced capitalist states. Nationalism is still essentially the idea of independence but today, the emphasis is on economic independence.

(1988: 22)

For Constantino, today's Third World nationalism is defensive; but he also points out, 'nationalism should graduate to wider and deeper social struggles to eradicate all forms of exploitation' (ibid.: 23). Eradicating all forms of exploitation points to Hall's third proposition, that is, the emergence of new identities, represented by the identity politics of the new social movements, including the emergence of new immigrant communities, which challenge the dominant ethnic composition.

Under such conditions, what is crucial here is that once we refer all this back to the trajectories of decolonization movements, to depart (1) from identification with the colonizer and (2) from the nativist movement's narcissistic tendency of a subject split, what can be the next move for a decolonized/post-colonial object of identification without returning to reproduce the same structure? The proposal for a critical syncretism at least attempts to push this possibility into a more progressive, more liberating direction. Again, Said's conclusion to *Culture and Imperialism* is evoked here as a point of departure:

No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies, but

there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and distinctiveness, as if that was all human life was about. . . . It is more rewarding – and more difficult – to think concretely and sympathetically, contrapuntally, about others than only about ‘us’. But this also means not trying to rule others, not trying to classify them or put them in hierarchies, above all, not constantly reiterating how ‘our’ culture or country is number one (or *not* number one, for that matter). For the intellectual there is quite enough of value to do without *that*.

(1993: 336)

What Said points to, to my reading at least, is the almost untranscendable sentiment and horizon of nationalism and the unconscious identification with the nation-state. I am not suggesting one should entirely give up one’s national identity and pretend to be a world citizen, or to hold a privileged position of cosmopolitanism; but perhaps only through a constant suspension of putting the priority of ‘national interest’ as the beginning and ending point, can we then begin to become others.

Cultural studies as an intellectual and internationalist project has been formed by the postwar decolonization movement and has been a critical force to continue that tradition. In this era, half a century after the Second World War, we are perhaps finally in a better position to keep a critical distance in re-investigating the long term cultural impacts of the colonial-imperial cultural imaginary inscribed on the local cultural formation and collective subjectivity. The motive is of course to deepen and renew the critical forces of the decolonization movement, to break away from the neocolonial structure of identification, and to caution the formation of a next wave of imperialist desire. Cultural studies in Asia (not Asian cultural studies) then might be able to unpack the history of antagonisms and anxieties generated within the region. However, one has to be extremely careful with the celebratory aspects of regionalism; the imperialist ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ project, for example, launched in the 1930s was able to operate under the name of regionalism. The Singaporean sociologist Chua Beng-huat (forthcoming) has identified the re-emergence of the call for a regional identity in Singapore to name itself ‘Asian’ rather than Singaporean. Is a new Pan-Asianism emerging? How new is this form of articulation? From listening to the preachings of several national leaders, ‘anti-West’, ‘anti-individualism’ and ‘anti-communism’ or ‘Confucianism’ recur in exactly the same terms uttered in the 1930s; these are still the dominant rhetoric used to construct this ‘new’ identity. On the other hand, more than ever in the history of the twentieth century, those who live in the Inter-Asia (East, Southeast and South Asia) regions are also in a better position to know what is going on in this part of the world without mediating through the outside. None the less, to develop genuine understandings of ‘ourselves’ and ‘neighboring others’, the colonial cultural imaginary which has

generated such psychoanalytic complexes as civilizationalism and little subjectivities has to be decolonized first.

*Postcoloniality and decolonization: reclaiming Marxism*

It is perhaps time to sum up and address what decolonization and postcoloniality might mean in this historical conjuncture.

If, as I suggested in the beginning, postcolonial studies does not signify the announcement of the arrival of a postcolonial era, then its legitimacy lies in the positing of an ethical positionality beyond colonialism from which to rethink and re-examine the historicity of colonial effects; an 'imaginative outside' of coloniality, which is to argue that we don't have to live permanently under the shadow of colonialism. That is, postcolonial studies has to reconnect to its tradition, to reclaim its genealogical roots, to recharge its originating critical spirit, i.e., Marxism. Without reinventing tradition, we have no ground to stand on; without roots, we do not know where we have come from; without critical spirit, we will only flow with the dominant currents to become reactive and reactionary. Marxism could be the unifying link of forces between the imperial centers (already past or otherwise) and the semi-, ex-, or still-existing colonies. A newer kind of Marxism can multiply its objects of identification as well as its enemies and structures. No longer simply based on class politics of the narrower type, contemporary pan-leftist social movements of gay and lesbian, bi- and trans-sexual, feminist, labor, farmer, environmental, aboriginal, anti-racist, and anti-war groups need to work together and identify with each other across neocolonial borders, so as to collectively confront the global structures of heterosexism, sexism, capitalism, racism, ethnicism, and statism and super-statism. Subject positions and identities are produced by, and are the effect and product of, these structures, not the other way round. If we truly believe in the possibility of abolishing the structures of colonization (i.e., oppression and domination), then postcolonial studies has to be able to think and move beyond identity politics of any sort to avoid the territorialization of subjectivities and subjective positions. Without charting such imaginary space outside the structures of colonization, we will fall back on the peaceful co-existence logic of multiculturalism and will be defeated by the power blocs, locally and globally.

I hope it has become clear by now what I mean by decolonization. If decolonization, at this historical conjuncture, no longer simply means the struggle for national independence but a struggle to abolish any form of colonization, then postcolonial/cultural studies has to recognize that (1) structurally, neocolonialism, neoimperialism, and globalization are the continuity and extension of colonialism (in the wider sense of the word, meaning any structure of domination); (2) colonialism is not yet a legacy, as mainstream postcolonial studies would have it, but still a lively operator in any geocolonial site on the levels of cultural imaginary and identification which reconfigures itself to reshape the

colonial cultural imaginary in the changing historical process of encounters (i.e., regionalization, the shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, etc.). That is to say, colonialism, engineered by the apparatus of capitalism, still covers the entire globe. The decolonization task of a postcolonial/cultural studies would then be to deconstruct, decenter, deform, debunk, disarticulate the colonial cultural imaginary produced in the historical process, and to reconstruct, rearticulate, reconnect a more democratic kind of imaginative lines of flight. In short, decolonization no longer refers to the objective historical movement in structure, but in action, in subjectivity, thought, cultural forms of expression, social institutions, and global political-economic structures. I have no intention of arguing that the only mission for cultural studies is decolonization, but I do believe that, to decolonize the colonial cultural imaginary (nationalism, nativism and civilizationalism) so as to free colonizing and colonized subjects from colonial history is one way, and only one way, to set the agenda for a politically-charged postcolonial cultural studies. As practitioners of cultural studies (lower case, without capitalizing the words), we have to see ourselves as the articulating agents and linking points of decolonization to continue that tradition of critical cultural studies; our research and discursive practices have to become the critical forces of that incomplete project of decolonization, at least to decolonize ourselves.

### **Rethinking the colonial, the nation-states and the movement**

Against the background of the problematic of decolonization, the essays collected in the volume could be read not simply as the effects of decolonization, but also as decolonization of thought in action. As such, the book divides into three interconnected sections. Part I on 'Refiguring the colonial' takes issue with the mainstream celebration of the coming of the 'postcolonial era' and attempts to demonstrate that the current political, economic, psychic and historical structures still operate within the limits of the colonialism and neocolonialism which the decolonization movement has tried desperately to break away from. Because the history of colonialism still prevails, Part II on 'Inside/outside the nation/state' posits the neocolonial structure of the nation-state as an effect of colonization and decolonization, and seeks to unpack the antagonism inside the nation, between the states, among the nations/states within the regional complex, and global encounters. The task initiated here is to deconstruct the colonial cultural imaginary of the national space and to rethink the relation between cultural studies and the (transnational) state. Part III on 'Renegotiating movements' begins with the recognition that identity politics, as an effect of decolonization which somehow continues the problematic of colonial identification, has to be decolonized, and then moves on to renegotiate and re-establish the relation between cultural studies and social movement in the politics of decolonization.

*Refiguring the colonial*

Part I opens with Professor Renato Constantino's 'Globalization and the South'. Taking us back to the Spanish, and later US moment in Filipino history the renowned historian reminds us that the rhetoric of globalization could not deal with uneven structural development.<sup>14</sup> The North-South divide resurfaces. The North led by the US, Constantino argues, 'is aiming for a more thorough recolonization of the South through such globalizing institutions as the World Bank, IMF, GATT, transnational corporations and media', through means such as the control of global trade and intellectual property right (as a means to force local states to import more products from the US). In such circumstances, nationalism in solidarity as a defensive rather than offensive mechanism becomes 'the only weapon by which countries of the South can stop the extraction of their wealth and resources'. Carefully distinguishing the underdogs from the stake holders of the South who have been co-opted by and in collaboration with the northern powers, Constantino calls for a nationalist 'people's movement' originating from within civil society which will interact nationally and internationally, and 'create a more fertile ground for a productive conjuncture of progressive ideas and actions'. More specific arguments and strategies will be picked up later in Part III by Muto Ichiyo in, especially Chapter 18.

Speaking from the Philippines in Southeast Asia, Constantino situates the globalization question in the trajectories of colonial history, which is contrary to the mainstream Anglo-American celebration of globalization, which has the effect of blurring geographical boundaries and causing the decline of nation-states. Constantino's intervention, then, evidences a geopolitically defined enunciative position, which could not view globalization apolitically and historically.

Constantino's analysis hints that, throughout the twentieth century at least, the US has been a critical force *in*, if not part of, Asia. To make the story more complex, the entire Asia-Pacific region in the twentieth century and in the foreseeable future has been shaped not only by the culture of US imperialism, but also by the history of Japanese colonialism. Leo Ching's 'Yellow skin, white masks' (Chapter 3) takes us back to early twentieth century Japan to pinpoint how Japanese colonialism was articulated as cultural imagination. Through re-encountering two important authors, Okakura Tenshin and Taguchi Ukichi, Ching is able to show us how Japanese colonialist identity was able to emerge and be defined by its two imaginary others: the West and Asia. The double movement of 'becoming whites' and 'Asia is one' is defined not only by the category of racial distinction/sameness, but critically through class differences. This racial similitude and class distinction of Japaneseness (over its neighbors) serves the function of asserting its difference from the West, and at the same time of justifying the civilizing mission it prepared for the East Asia Co-Prosperty Project. Ching provides a much-needed service to cultural studies in that he puts cultural history back in his account so as to better understand the

shape of the contemporary cultural imaginary. Through Ching's analysis, one might be able to understand the ambivalent status of 'Japan' in the geopolitics of Asia: its insider/outsider status has been defined in that moment of history. Or, in fact, a pervasive difficulty is revealed, at least throughout the Asian continent, that the ex-colonized societies have to deal with the imposed cultural imaginary *vis-à-vis* 'the West', and at the same time to confront the 'neighbors' without falling into a mediation with the imperialist imagination. Ching's 'Japan' of the early twentieth century then becomes a miniaturized picture of the contemporary identity redefining crisis. With the triumphalist sentiment for the 'rise of Asia', the highly orchestrated talk on 'our' Asian values, which are distinctively different from the West's, heralded by various state machines, has been defined by a resentment against the 'colonialist West'. The recent report on the 1996 debate between Samuel Huntington, representing a right-wing neo-imperialist position, and scholars from the East and Southeast Asia region, gathering in Singapore and Malaysia, reveals such a dangerous dilemma.<sup>15</sup> An 'Asian' alliance was formed against the 'West'. On the other hand, when questions are asked – Is Asia one place? What *are* the Asian values? – then a universal Asian identity collapses, and differences of tradition, history and past hatreds resurface.

This newly emerging form of 'pan-Asianism' reminds us, in reading Ching's analysis, of the early twentieth century 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Project' of Japanese colonialism. Though the historical conditions have been transformed in every sphere, the ideological articulation of a 'unity within difference' remains similar. Unlike the earlier practices, this round of realignment has seen a struggle for occupation of the leading position between multiple sites other than Japan: Lee Kwan-yew's Singapore, Mahathir Mohamad's Malaysia, Jiang Zemin's China.<sup>16</sup> Although, on the level of statist politics, one realizes the necessity of alliance of unified forces to balance US hegemonic imperialist 'free' attacks anywhere on earth, such as Clinton's missile game with Saddam Hussein, the danger of a colonialist imagination of the earlier mode as well as the reactive resentment defined by the 'West' has to be constantly guarded against.

It is clear then that the imaginary 'the West and the Rest' problematic still occupies 'our' psychic-cultural space. The West has to be dealt with not so much as a geographical entity but as emotionally charged imaginary. But of course, just as the imagination within the Asian continent changes over time, largely due to the shifting gravity of the global economy, the previous pinnacle of the West now reconfigures into a 'New Europe' in response to postwar US hegemony which has constituted Europe as its sub-colony. Paradoxically, Ching's analysis of Okakura Tenshin's 'Asia is one' which was formulated under the shadow of European colonialism is now taken up by the previously unquestionable assumption, whether 'Europe is one'. Ien Ang's timely analysis of the present state of eurocentrism takes up urgent issues confronting Europe. Taking her cue from the recent formation of the European Union, driven by political

and economic interests, the truly diasporic cultural studies scholar, who has lived in Indonesia and Europe, now based in Australia ('closer to home'), argues that its ideological legitimation lies in a self-conscious articulation of 'the unity of European culture'. This re-research of Europe, a re-europeanization, is now founded on a sense of crisis, an almost inverted logic of orientalism. Besieged by 'the Rest' to 'Westernize' (or in the Japanese intellectual tradition, to 'europeanize') themselves, European intellectuals are forced to take on the world-historical responsibility to fill in the content and form of the new problems and new solutions confronting new Europe. As I pointed out earlier, the 'nativization' of Europe, which is the other side of the Asianization of Asia, is precisely in response to the presence of 'the Rest', the cultural others inside and outside the European continent. To my reading, Ang's acute observation is that this is perhaps the first time that a fully self-conscious articulation of eurocentrism is reclaimed, redeemed and reaffirmed, thanks to the deep sense of self-doubt and crisis caused by the realization that Europe is no longer superior but as ordinary as the others, in a politico-economic sense and that its 'unique' identity can only be redeemed by its sense of cultural superiority. The only legitimate critique can come from Europe itself, as self-defense, and more importantly as the revival of its own identity. The dialectic of eurocentrism and anti-eurocentrism thus absorbs the European subject into itself. This defensive mode of eurocentrism can perhaps be understood as a decolonization effect, a colonial legacy once priding itself now has to come to terms with its demise and its cultural relativity. But the final move is bound to see Europe losing control of its future trajectories. In the long run, Europe's transcendental superiority will be broken down, not solely through the deconstructionist movement, initiated by the always-already hybrid subjects, but through more active engagement with the 'outside'. Ang cites Eco's statement on the task, 'In one hundred years Europe could be a colored continent. That's another reason to be culturally, mentally ready to accept a multiplicity, to accept inter-breeding, to accept this confusion. Otherwise it will be a complete failure'. In other words, the defensive self-absorption of eurocentrism will perhaps eventually be broken by the other from inside out, for the presence of the 'colored' immigrants massively moving into the uncontaminated space will make the continent realize 'white' is not beyond categorization but also a 'colour' among colors. (It was truly amazing to watch the Hong Kong hand-over on TV in London. Indifference was the dominant mode. The nostalgic rhetoric to assert that 'we have done all the good things in Hong Kong, and hence New China' is symptomatic enough, especially when juxtaposed with the televised tear-shedding of Patton's family (don't cry guys, you have done all the good things, isn't it?). One could expect the English Left to celebrate the fact that English colonialism is nearly over and done with. Rid of this burden, the Left could be getting on with other important work. But, no, that's not what happened. The Left did not seem to know what to do with such an event, globally circulated through satellite. People in London do care though, on the other hand. They got into



a fight, on screen, about which side (Chinese Communist Party or Labour Party) had produced more and better fireworks!

If Europe is still caught up with its own colonial legacy, the 'almost last colony' (after 7 July 1997, the 'almost last' disappeared; but it does not mean Hong Kong is no longer inscribed by colonial traces), Hong Kong, ironically, is on its way to 'managerialize colonialism,' as the title of Law Wing-Sang's Chapter 5 suggests. Writing in the mood of the '1997' great transition ('to return to the motherland'), Law sharply poses the questions: 'Is nationalism really an opposing other to colonialism? Under what conditions would colonialist practices, as well as its principles, be not only tolerated by nationalism but be actively adopted as an ingredient of a nationalist project?' Armed with all the existing research on colonial history, anyone who is interested in how decolonization works will immediately embark on the almost last colony. As it turns out, according to Law, Hong Kong has actually become the 'manager' for its 'mother land' in mediating between colonial capitalism (the West) and the ongoing project of modernization in China. The dominant imagination of the possible location of Hong Kong in relation to power is thus mediating through the discourse of managerialism which articulates colonialism and nationalism as a project of modernization. What is most interesting in Law's analysis is his argument that present-day managerialism does not take shape in this transitional moment, but rather has a genealogical root in postwar colonial governmentality. Tracing the earlier local literati-modernizers' attempt to manage and co-operate with British colonial ruling, Law convincingly charts out the courses of discursive shifts in responses to changing political conditions from the 1960s onward. How local elites manage and cope with the post 1997 'recolonization' remains to be seen.

Hong Kong's 'colonial miracle' is further amplified in Chapter 6, Ding-Tzann Lii's 'A colonized empire'. As a colonial city-state, Hong Kong's most visible performance has been perhaps its cultural industry. From 1980 onward, Hong Kong films have dominated the market in East and Southeast Asia; moreover, Hong Kong action films have also deeply penetrated the home video market in such places as the west coast of the US. Puzzled by the colony's ability to export its cultural production, which seems to be unique in the history of colonialism, Lii attempts to identify the different cultural logics at work between the older mode of imperialist operation and this new 'colonized empire'. According to Lii, the modes of articulation which exist between the outside and the local shift from 'incorporation' to 'yielding'. No longer modeled on Hollywood's imposition on the local cultural space, the Hong Kong film industry actively invites local intervention in its production process so as to guarantee its cultural familiarity and relevance in different locales; even narrative elements and forms can be changed according to local market demands. The success of this operation has pushed Hollywood to reconsider its persistent working mode.

What lies behind Lii's analysis is a deeper theoretical concern: whether this

new form of marginal colonialism constitutes a rupture in the history of global capitalism, or is a new strategy for capitalist expansion.<sup>17</sup> A question, to be sure, which cannot be answered without further analysis in different sectors of production. But Lii's identification of the logic of yielding does point to an emerging form of transnational operation. For instance, the Taiwan-based computer company, ACE8, now the fifth largest in the world, has developed a new investment strategy which will not exceed 50 per cent of the overall capital, so as to motivate local mobilization of resources to generate profit. Of course, the sum total of interests for ACE8 will be greater. Whether this form of joint-venture will be more equal to local capitalists, less exploiting to local labor forces, and more of a 'cosmopolitanism' is still to be analyzed.

Central to Lii's argument is that the media industry in the periphery performs a function of regionalization and localization, that is Asianization. It is through mechanisms such as film and satellite TV that the imagined living community could be established. In effect, in conjunction with the rise of the mass market in the region, the potential of Hong Kong's cultural production lies in its ability to challenge the center, forcing Hollywood to change, for instance. As Lii puts it, 'if that occurs, the West and the East will have more of a dialogic and egalitarian relation. . . . It is in this spirit that I see marginal imperialism as an imperialism to end imperialism.' Whether Lii's forecast is true or not remains to be seen.

In this connection, Ashis Nandy's short chapter on 'A new cosmopolitanism: Towards a dialogue of Asian civilizations' (Chapter 7), representing his continuing effort to deconstruct the colonial West and to search for alternatives, can be read as a step further on the road to demonstrating how dialogues within Asia are possible. Nandy points out, 'Asia is a geographical, not a cultural entity'. Past attempts to define Asia culturally were essentially 'reactions to Western colonialism', not an autonomous search for cultural unity. Excepting perhaps, Okakura's 'Asia is one', there are not enough cultural resources to formulate axes of dialogues without mediating through 'the West'. Nandy's entire essay is, then, at pains to detail 'the West *inside* Asia', which often results in an Asian voice spoken through a Western tone. What gives Nandy tremendous hope are the changing historical conditions within which 'Asia has now a place for even the West . . . the West itself might some day have to return through Asia.' This obsession with the 'West', though no less problematic, as pointed out earlier, is indeed a historically, psychoanalytically grounded reality to be disarticulated and decolonized.

Read together, the essays in Part I can be seen as a refiguring of colonial history, an attempt to come to terms with 'the West' or Western colonialism, a decolonization movement in thought.

#### *Inside/outside the nation/state*

As the figure of the colonial continues to occupy a critical imaginary space, its by-product, the nation-state, is now emerging more than ever as the central

articulating agent in the Asia-Pacific. Contrary to the will of theorists located in the (ex-)colonial centers, the nations/states in the region are, instead of declining, becoming the most powerful forces to be confronted. The question of national identity and nationalism in relation to that of the regional and the global straddles the region. The heightened ethnic-nationalist conflicts are fought through and articulated by the state leadership; the migration of labor and capital is tightly controlled and organized by the states; the alliance of the states resulted in the intra-regional formation of super states such as ASEAN. Part II takes on different levels of response to questions of the nation and the state without falling into the trap of nationalism and statism.

In Chapter 9, 'Culture, multiracialism and national identity in Singapore', Chua Beng-Huat, perhaps one of the most prolific writers in Southeast Asia, extends the argument of his important book, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore* (1995), to retrace the shaping of the cultural sphere by the formation of the Singapore nation-state, uniquely constituted as a multi-racial nation, and the recent claim of an 'Asian' identity so as to erase and unify differences. Rather than celebrating multiracialism and its attendant multiculturalism, Chua details the mechanisms which 'enable the state to place itself at a "neutral" position above the discursively constituted "races" and their respective positions and derives for itself a high degree of relative autonomy through its exercise of power, while simultaneously insulating itself from claims of entitlement of the people as both racialized collectives and individual citizens'. The failure to install Confucianism as a state ideology *vis-à-vis* the West to construct a Singaporean identity has forced national policy to take the 'Asianization' turn; it claims to inherit not one but three major Asian civilizations: 'Chinese/Confucian, Malay/Islamic and Indian/Hindu-Buddhist'. This reconfiguration of multiracialism serves a double function not only to 'multi-civilizationalize' its internal cohesion, but also to meet the demand of a global-regional trend. As Chua points out succinctly, 'in self-interest, it is of strategic economical and political importance for Singapore to insert itself into a larger piece. Asia may not need Singapore, but Singapore needs Asia.' (The same thing can be said of Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) Chua's words may well be modest in scope, but the political and cultural mood of Asianization does begin to resonate throughout the continent. This 'needing Asia' operates beyond the state-capital alliance to influence the movement sector. The long-term impacts on cultural formation in each locale remain to be seen.

If, as Chua puts it, 'Singapore was a reluctant nation' of the postcolonial sort, then Thailand is perhaps the only nation-state in Asia which has never been colonized by imperial powers as others have. However, this does not mean Thai culture is not subject to hegemonic influences. Without too much historical baggage and resentment inherited from colonial masters, Thai culture seems to have taken in outside resources in a more open-ended syncretic form. Ubonrat Siriyuvasak's 'Thai pop music and cultural negotiation in

everyday politics' (Chapter 10) traces the historical formation of contemporary pop music, and analyzes how in this wide cultural field, diversified musical forms are now adopted by different social groups. The categorization of pop music into Lukkroong, Luktoong, String and Pleng Pua Chiwit, as a result of syncretic articulation of Thai musical forms and Western pop/rock, does not designate simply competing genres, but a battlefield of cultural struggle between the urban and the rural, the elite and the poor, tradition and modernity, the state and the popular, sensuous pleasure and piousness, the attempt to regulate and control, and the attempt to resist and appropriate, and the music industry and an alternative intellectual underground. The categories become incommensurably fluid, due to the music industry's incorporation and blending of genres as well as subject groups' adaptation to new historical conditions. What we see in Ubonrat Siriyuvasak's analysis is the negotiating process of cultural forms and practices. As she puts it, 'popular culture is a relatively open arena in which a variety of discourses are played out simultaneously.' The new direction of Pleng Luktoong, for instance, 'converges with the emerging ethos of secularization, but at the same time, resists its inhumane mode of social relations . . . The tragic feeling of hopelessness is accelerating not receding. Nevertheless, the aggressive beat of disco music expresses the rage, the frustration and the fear with optimism in its style of eroticism and humor.' The cultural geography of music which she is able to construct here is perhaps unique only in its historical specificities. With the formation of a culture industry in the region, the dominance of the American Top 40 and Rock 'n' Roll has been in decline since the early 1980s. For three or four decades, the pervasive infiltration of American pop and rock transformed the music landscape. Nevertheless, there seems to be a syncretic process at work to articulate the local and the outside rather than a 'universal abandon'. Wherever one moves within the region in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, no matter whether the lyrical languages are understandable or not, one does sense and feel a 'common' musical language, though not without specific local distinctions. In fact, anyone living in East Asia would notice that a strange, hybrid form of pop music has developed across that region. One does not have to understand the lyrics of the songs, but could still shake one's body and enjoy 'oneselves'. I once went with feminist friends in Seoul to a lively concert, performed by a syncretically dressed folk singer (a hybrid composite of Boy George, Barbra Streisand and the Korean folk tradition). Even without the ability to understand the Korean language, I did not have to count on translation. It just did not matter. It was the best performance I have ever witnessed. The physically short singer could, in one song, sing like a macho man with extremely low pitch, but also could yell out in an unbelievably feminine tone with the highest pitch. This East Asian form of cultural production obviously grew out of long-term colonial history: Japan, the US, and now Hong Kong; almost exactly the similar historic logic could apply in the Taiwan KTV instance (see Chen, forthcoming). The colonial and neocolonial cultural

traditions produced a widely acceptable rhythm for the body, mediating through electronic media. Further historical comparative studies, targeting various sites such as music production, can be done to identify the logics of articulation between the local, the regional and the global.

If Chua's and Siriyuvasak's essays center on the interaction of the nation/state with the outside, Budiawan's Chapter 11, 'Representing the voices of the silenced: East Timor in contemporary Indonesian short stories' takes on the difficult task of recovering the suppressed voices of East Timor within the context of Indonesia. The difficult situation after 1975 has been oppressive to people living within Indonesia, partly through the state's censorship of information flow; even if it is known, it is mediated through preferred, official narratives. In response to the mainstream formulation, Budiawan attempts to recover an alternative narrative of East Timor through critical analysis of contemporary short stories. 'When journalism is silenced, literature has to speak.' Budiawan reflexively argues, 'Interestingly, the practice of using "unity and oneness" to judge that others have no sense of nationalism is also often found in civil society itself. . . . In short, the construction of nationalism as a grand story has constituted a comfort zone which makes people "feel (more) secured" in it, so that they do not want to be thrown out of such comfort.' The wider ramification of Budiawan's analysis is that critical intellectuals everywhere can be oppositional to the state, but they are still bound up by the nationalist cultural imaginary constructed by the state machine. How to move out of nationalistic entrapment becomes a strategic question.

In this context, Chapter 8, Kenneth Dean's 'Despotic empire/nation-state' begins to locate possibilities arising out of local practices. Through his fieldwork on religious practices in South and Southeastern China, Dean identifies the way traditional popular cultural forms in local systems of exchange respond to, and operate beyond, the nationalism formulated by the state. The heavy trafficking of popular religious organizations across borders, between Fujian province, Taiwan and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, made possible by global capital flows, Dean argues, seems to be in effect a desire to resist the 'totalizing project of nationalist modernity'. The 'authentic mazu' was traveled in Taiwan in 1997. Throughout the island, 'she' was enthusiastically welcomed. Controversies occurred. The Taiwanese independent faction of the fundamentalist kind argued that these Chinese people were trying to make monies (donations) from our people's pockets. We have to stop them. On the other hand, when Da Lai La Ma was here, the fundamentalist agitated for Tibetan independence (to project the desire of themselves). Well, it did not matter for the religious populace. The stupidity of the political nation-state was passed over. Thousands and thousands of people went to these types of ceremonies. These fragmented examples of resistance, Dean argues, 'achieve maximum flexibility by re-inventing [themselves] at a level of individuation both below that of the homogeneity demanded by a nation, and yet at the same time, at a level that is suppler and more vibrant than the rigid consistency

of a state'. The cracks and leaks, always existing in the community's subtle encounters with the state, construct a relative autonomous space for the 'assemblage of desire operating at the communal level to simultaneously resist the state and inscribe the all too human'. Whether these popular practices could transform the rigidity of statist form remain an open-ended question; but the very existence of such form does indicate cultural resources available for 'creative local responses to global capitalism and nationalistic cultural hegemony'.

If Ken Dean is desperately seeking an alternative modality to the trans-local in response to capitalism and statist nationalism, then Mark Reid's Chapter 13, 'African-American cultural studies' can be read as charting out major strategies practiced in African-American history, and the subsequent critical attempt to move beyond the existing limits. The strategies emerging in successive historical trajectories – a conservativist accommodation, a liberalist appropriation and a nationalist resistance – constitute the contemporary relations of African-American culture and mainstream European hegemony. In response to these racially bounded articulations, Reid observes an emerging critical paradigm to account for gender, sexuality and class issues, under the rubric of 'postNegritude'. The cultural historian argues, 'the root of postNegritude is the psychical and cultural history of postcolonialism. A postNegritude orientation appropriates ideas while it resists the colonizing urge to find legitimacy in the arms of static academic discourses.' Through analysis of Marlon Riggs' *Tongues United* and Spike Lee's *Jungle Fever*, Reid's postNegritude shift not only interrogates the rigidity of identity politics, but goes one step further to advance a critical synthesis. The direction Reid's chapter takes echoes a much-needed epistemological break in the wider spaces of cultural studies; a 'critical syncretism' might be a beginning point to think about different levels of analysis between and across geographical spaces.

Meaghan Morris's analysis of 'white panic' in Chapter 12 charts the psychosocial complex within the history of Australia. Her powerful analysis, through the figure of Mad Max, leads us to a thorough understanding of the present moment of the Pauline Hanson phenomenon. To my own understanding, the popularity of the Hanson agenda is not only racially based but also class grounded. The multicultural policy of the state, as a mechanism to seduce 'Asian' capital for Australia to survive economically, has been dominant for the past twenty years, with the result that the state has forgotten the 'white' laboring classes who now feel emotionally and politically excluded by the system. Their revenge, then, is not only directed against state policy, but also projects a resentment against the middle class, more well-off migrants who are now taking away what 'we' had before. The agency, Hanson, turns this class resentment into racist politics and erases class politics by centering on the ethnic nationalism question. Morris's account of white panic, though not directly targeted at the Hanson phenomenon, offers a longer term trajectory for us to understand the basis of this political maneuvering.

Though the articulation could be seen as a model to understand the wider context of white panic across the globe, one has to be reminded of its regional specificities. Australia's white racism was and has been 'defensive' rather than 'aggressive'. As a political practice that has constituted the dominant 'Asian' imaginary of 'Australia', the White Australia policy was interestingly entangled with the Taiwan question. The policy was implemented in 1901, the time of Australian federation, six years after Taiwan became the first Japanese colony in 1895, as the result of winning the Sino-Japan war. To defend itself from the feared Japanese colonialism, colonial racism was adopted to exclude any 'colored immigrants'.<sup>18</sup> This defensive mechanism of fear has later defined the difficulty of Australian national identity *vis-à-vis* 'Asia' throughout the twentieth century, even to the present day, when 'Australia' has become the ideal site of immigration for the middle classes from the entire Asian continent. In other words, the history of white panic did not happen recently, but started in the late nineteenth century, the peak moment of global colonialism within which Japanese fascistic militarism was situated. As I proposed earlier, the relationship of Asia with the world could be seen in light of 'Japan's' relation to the world in this earlier moment of history, though Japan no longer monopolized the position to speak to, and be defined by, the colonial 'West'. Therefore, though Australia's national identity was historically defined by 'Japan' after 1895, like Japan, Australia's positioning and identity was and has been bounded by its location within the colonial and neocolonial structure. This is, to be sure, not to defend Australian white racism, but to explain how that overt discrimination could be understood to take place at a specific historical conjuncture. Seen from this angle, 'Australia' should be held responsible for the racist formation of White Australia policy, but others are also culpable: Japanese colonialism and English imperialist colonialism, in their competition with other colonial powers, were equally guilty of the specific Australian practice. Unfortunately, the reactive state leadership in the region erased the earlier part of history to hold Australia responsible for its own conduct; and hence completely deleted the problems of other colonial forces. Thus understood, we who live in the region should not give the cultural power to reactionary state leaders to continue that line of colonial racism, to exclude 'white' Australia.

Colonial conquest has forced Australia and New Zealand to be part of 'Asia', and these two geographical spaces could be seen as part of Inter-Asia, economically and politically. In fact, to make the always-already hybrid 'Asia' more culturally mixed is only one step short of preparation against the global rise of racism. And in fact, tremendous lessons can be learned from Australia's instance in preventing ethnic and racial war from happening on a global scale.

Having analyzed cultural practices in relation to the nation and states in various contexts, let me end with Tony Bennett's 'Cultural studies: the Foucault effect', the keynote address to the first Trajectories Conference, which unfortunately could not be published here. But I do feel an obligation to 'include' his address in this context. In his essay, Bennett is arguing for a paradigm shift

in cultural studies, that is, from Gramsci to Foucault; or more precisely, from a particular version of Gramsci to a particular vein of Foucault. Bennett argues that:

Foucault's work points to 'the increasing governmentalization of social relations as a necessary and inescapable horizon of contemporary social and political life which, as such, conditions both the kind of practical influence intellectuals can reasonably expect to have and the manner in which that influence can be exercised. . . . This entails recognizing that changing how cultural resources function in the context of relations of power usually involves modifying the ways in which cultural forms and activities are governmentally deployed as parts of programs of social management. This, in turn, requires that intellectuals lower the threshold of their political vistas in a manner that will enable them to connect with the debates and practices through which reformist adjustments to the administration of culture are actually brought about.

What is crucial in Bennett's shift is, indeed, a rethinking of the uneasy relation between cultural studies and the state (or to use his term, governmentality). In the past, cultural studies practices have grown out of and have always seen themselves as a counter-hegemonic formation. (I am not trying to romanticize cultural studies here; but most critical practitioners would agree on this at least, unless one is simply using the sign, cultural studies, to be a careerist.) Its intellectual contribution has been a critique of the state, mainstream culture and the hegemonic power bloc. The mood seems to have changed. There is a vein of cultural studies hoping to generate more influence in the cultural sphere. The Australian Key Center for Cultural and Media Policy, directed by Bennett, is a representative case. Given the condition that one should not essentialize the role of the state and the Australian state might well be different, the shift seems to be taking place elsewhere. For instance, Eric Louw, in a recent discussion of cultural studies in the new South Africa, has detailed a dilemma: used to being an oppositional anti-apartheid practice, under a new political regime, cultural studies in South Africa has become a cultural and media policy think-tank. A similar 'opportunity' is also opened by structural changes in places such as South Korea after Kim Young-sam, Taiwan after Lee Teng-hui, and the Philippines after Aquino. In fact, once the city of Taipei was taken over by the former opposition, a mainstream feminist then articulated a position called 'state feminism' to justify her own bloc's alliance with the city-state, in order to win over resources; and in so doing, allied the feminist movement to the 'powers that be'. Is cultural studies most politically effective if it works with and becomes part of the state apparatus? Should cultural studies constantly distance itself from the power bloc? These issues are worth debating. At least in the



Australian context, once the conservative government took power, the optimism around working for the state in order to transform the 'national' cultural space seems to be called into question.

*Renegotiating movements*

As many practitioners have already pointed out, for the past three decades or so, the question of resistance has been central to the project of cultural studies. It almost becomes a standard procedure, in the concluding part of the analysis, to project a desire to locate sites or implications for resistance. 'Resistance studies' are no doubt essential to keep optimism alive. But the search for resistance often distorts analysis, which blinds critics' eyes to the problems involved. So often, it turns out to be either lip-service or a release of intellectual guilt. Power is everywhere, so is resistance – end of story. No doubt, part of the contribution that cultural studies has been making is the constant accumulation of analysis to bring to light the fact that resistance does exist, no matter how disparate and discrete it may be. This mundane reminder, or what Meaghan Morris calls the 'banality of cultural studies', might well be the past, present and future 'basic needs' of cultural studies. But the academicization of resistance coincides with colonization of the subaltern subjects into scholarly commodities. Furthermore, if the institutionalization of cultural studies on campus is the only direction of the future, how is it different from other academic practices, often trashed by cultural studies practitioners? Obviously, there is that general sentiment of 'not quite enough' as just that. How can the analysis and practices be articulated to other critical social forces? What then can be the political project of cultural studies from the 1990s onward?

As I stated at the very beginning, cultural studies grew out of the global decolonization movement, expressed largely in the form of social movements. Cultural studies in England has been connected to the labor, anti-nuclear, anti-racism, immigrant and women's movements; in South Africa, to the anti-apartheid movement; in the US, to the feminist, gay and lesbian, and ethnic minority movements; in Australia, to the working class, women's, aboriginal, and immigrant movements; in Korea, to the feminist, and workers' movements, etc. To say the least, if there have been no constant challenges from the movement sectors and no responses to social struggles, cultural studies might have been buried long ago.<sup>19</sup> Epistemic stability in cultural studies has been interrupted by the emergence of new subjects: working class youth, women, gays and lesbians, aboriginals, and immigrants. In response to waves of new contradictions, Marxism, feminism, Queer studies, postcolonial studies, diasporic studies, etc., have become the motor forces which drive the cultural studies project forward.

There is nothing nostalgic about this remembering. Without tradition, there is no solid basis for constructing effective politics. But when one looks around, how much work has been done in the field to focus studies on the social

movements, or to analyse these agencies of social changes?<sup>20</sup> This is then the motive of Part III.

Obviously, one of the most energetic forces emerging in the 1990s is the gay and lesbian movement. Its tactics and strategies seem to have fundamentally transformed the earlier images of social movement. The play with mainstream media politics constitutes one of its keys.<sup>21</sup> To cite Manuel Castell's inversion of the standardized formula – 'Think Locally, Act Globally' – media politics can be one of the explanations of the global impact of Anglo-American gay and lesbian movements.

Hsiao-Hung Chang, in Chapter 14, importantly documents a particular event in action. Arguably, the Queer (*tung-chih*) movement in Taiwan is the most energetic and visible form of social movement at this moment, almost to the extent of displacing the earlier momentum of the feminist movement. The 'success' of this movement has its specificities for various reasons. First, lesbian activists, who were mostly the younger generation students in the late 1980s, who gained organizing experiences in the feminist movement, who have learned from and have been nurtured by the earlier generation of academic feminists associating with various women's organizations, are now taking the lead in the movement. Gay men, on the other hand, do not have that peculiar historical experience. And therefore, the organizing capacity mostly belongs to the lesbian subject. Second, the booming of the commodification of identity has, since 1994, produced an entire industry of queer writing, for instance; a considerable number of gays and lesbians or their sympathizers are now occupying strategic positions in the publishing houses, or in the wider media space. Third, now that the feminist movement is gradually moving into and being incorporated into the state power (on the level of county, city and national assembly) through familiar mechanisms such as granting of funding to conduct 'research' projects for state policy, conservative right-wing feminists begin to suppress any 'non-acceptable' identity, so as to win over middle-class support. The intensity of this desire to be part of the state (some elements which used to be 'oppositional' are now part of the reconfiguration of political power) can even be strong enough to formulate a 'state feminism' position. Under such conditions, the used-to-be 'sisters' or 'daughters' (i.e., lesbians) are now under attack.

Chang's analysis of 'queer valentine' might be understood in such a context. When the used-to-be oppositional political party is taking over Taipei City, resources have begun to flow into movement sectors across the board, to implement city policies, so as to win election tickets. Here, nationalist politics meets sexual politics, and of course, sexual politics is bound to lose. Taipei New Park has been the landmark site for gay sex/gatherings for the past thirty years. But now the state is trying to reclaim the 28 February 1947 (228) massacre, to put a memorial monument and museum into the New Park and the Park is about to be evacuated for 'sacred' uses.<sup>22</sup> The 228 event was the symbolic foundation of the Taiwan Independence movement and is sacred to Taiwanese nationalism.

There is a feeling that it should not be associated with queer sex. Bushes were torn down, toilets 'cleaned up'. To defend 'our' own territory, an alliance of activist groups was formed into 'queer front' (tung-jeng). Chang's analysis centers on one episode of the movement. The strategy adopted was to draw media attention so as to press the state to concede – a strategy commonly practiced by movement sector of other sorts. The University Women Student Alliance made a 'toilet movement' occupying men's rest rooms to call public attention to the problem of limited space in women's toilets. The Labor movement did a tremendous amount of cultural work during the 1996 Presidential election: the 'black hand' band sang songs like the Internationale, a theater group imitated high-kicking women's dancing style, etc., during the 'public hearing' to interrogate politicians' public policy proposals. But activists know too well that one cannot play media politics without grassroots organizing, whereas the feminist and gay and lesbian movement was either centering on lobbying for state policy or media politics, without a grassroots element. The problem is difficult to resolve, largely because national, if not nationalist, politics has been easily accessible.

To get back to the tension between the feminist turn to conservatism and lesbian activism, it is worth documenting an episode which reveals the conflicts. In a recent public forum, some 200 people were present to debate on the relationship between feminism and lesbian activism, for the first time. Over 90 per cent of the participants came from the gay and lesbian sector. This under-participation of feminist constituencies is symptomatic enough: the mainstream state feminists escaped from the scene. And worse, the more established feminists kept on talking about the necessity for a lesbian subjectivity to emerge, without noticing that the event itself was nothing if not assertion of such subjectivity. Conservative feminist ignorance of queer identity/politics is evident in such a gathering. A well-known liberal feminist ended up by saying, 'Oh well, in other panels, there was always a man there to be ridiculed and served as a target of attack, and today I am playing that role.' With that statement, she failed to address the problem that she was part of the patriarchal system and she refused to recognize the existence of the heterosexual structure from which she benefits so much. Such a homophobic mentality prevails in the mainstream feminist movement. But this is not to suggest that warning has never been given before to deal with this delicate relationship between gender and sexual politics. The quarterly cultural-political magazine, *Isle Margin*, published a special issue on the subject in 1993; the 'Women nation – fake identification' issue, no. 9, attempts to bridge that gap of consciousness. The discursive formulation did not receive any serious attention from the feminist establishment. 'Yes, "we" see "you", but "you" have to stand on "your" own', has, since then, become the standardized response from the mainstream feminist sector. A split in the feminist movement seems now inevitable. Unfortunately, this is the problem of any form of identity politics: carving up the territory, no desire to connect with others, mind one's own business.

Like Chang's attempt to analyze the cultural politics of the queer movement but operating on a different site, Cindy Patton demonstrates how cultural criticism has been strategically practiced in constructing discursive space in the international AIDS project. Patton's 'Critical bodies' (Chapter 16), conducted in a dialogic style at the 1992 Trajectories Conference, is a critical intervention to remind us that social movements can no longer be narrowly confined, conducted and understood within national boundaries. The effects of AIDS organizing in the Western context does have global impacts, such as the fact that community-based programming to suit local needs has become a model for AIDS activism; the ways of perceiving the HIV 'problems' tend to 'feminize "Asian AIDS"'; and international health policy will influence the distribution of resources throughout the world. In this arena of international organizing, cultural criticism has become central to frame the issues; to construct the terrains and to formulate strategic languages to win over popular support. This is where media politics, grassroots organizing, and cultural criticism intersect. Patton's implicit call for alliance and intervention from the cultural studies side has to be paid special attention. It cannot be that cultural studies only belongs to the university campus; it is relevant to the politics of the real movement world, and cultural studies has to recharge its desire to find the appropriate sites other than academic journals to relink to the movement and the world of cultural politics. The ghettoization of cultural studies into pure academicism is unjustified and escapes into self-interest to secure its own academic space where all its energies are wasted. This is particularly true in the US context, which is at once the most visible and the worst model available. But once the desire is projected into places other than university campuses, once energies are spent in the movements, the cultural studies world then becomes completely open-ended and has a real bearing. Besides Patton's type of AIDS activism, the University of Technology, Sydney, recently developed the 'Shop Fronts' project, led by media/cultural studies scholar, Jeannie Martin, to organize critical scholars in responses to the activist and community demand, to undertake research for them. This attempt to reconnect scholarship with activism is potentially a better model than the campus activism rhetoric.

In fact, this 'activist scholar' mode has been widely practiced in the Inter-Asia region, in Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, etc., in these places, intellectuals have always been at the forefront; and the most dramatic instance seems to be in the Philippines, where, for instance, several thousand NGOs are operating on the University of Philippines campuses. In this connection, Stephen Muecke, the first cultural studies professor in Australia, through his own long-term involvement in the aboriginal community in the Australian context, surveys the main players and strategies in the struggles for indigenous rights in Australia. Chapter 15, 'Cultural activism – indigenous Australia 1972–94' sets out to distinguish political from cultural activism, a common strategy adopted by 'indigenous' activists. As Muecke puts it, 'Cultural activism can have the same result as political activism, but it doesn't

look the same. It has the feature of mobilizing cultural representations as performances. It is a tactical "bring out" of cultures as a valuable and scarce "statement". In analyzing the photo of Denis Walker's children, widely released in newspapers in Australia, Muecke argues that there has been a long tradition of Aboriginal cultural activism, to evoke and reproduce their own traditions. In dialogue with aboriginal activist, Martin Nakata, Muecke concludes by proposing to widen the scope of aboriginal cultural activism: 'Apart from street theater, cultural activism can also take the form of international conferences for indigenous peoples, and essays like Nakata's articulate local dispossession and international history.' Indeed, if aboriginals across the globe do not belong to the colonial system of the nation-state, the question of how to culturally bypass the simple 'Declaration' model of the UN (more precisely the US – united states, in every sense of the word) to form international alliances is a critical issue to be confronted.<sup>23</sup>

The kind of cultural activism is further amplified in Yung-ho Im's 'The media, civil society and new social movements in Korea 1985–93' (Chapter 17), which traces the developments of various citizens' press movements against the mainstream press. Sympathetic and yet critical, Im convincingly shows the dilemma and structural problems within and outside the movements. The middle class reformist tendency, the obsession with media (celebrity) politics, the lack of grassroots solidarity, hierarchical structure internal to the movement organizations, leadership's personal connections and struggle for power, the inability to transform the structural operation, the overwhelming power of the state even after the 'political democratization' process, etc., all point to problems confronted in Korea; and in fact, elsewhere such as in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the Philippines, and South Africa. In my reading, there seems to be structural similarity in these places in terms of the historical dynamic between the state, civil society, capital and neocolonial power. The post-World War Two national decolonization movement in the East Asia region saw a common tendency of the emergence of authoritarian regimes, partly established by the US neoimperialist power. With the alibi of combating the 'communist bloc', the US set up political regimes which were easier to control; within this neocolonial structure, the 'big' state monopolized the power over capital and civil society. In the subsequent era, which saw tremendous economic growth, the formation of what can be termed a 'consumer society', within which the middle class were no longer satisfied with the feudal mode of political life, and radically challenged the authoritarian regime. During this moment, we saw the loosening of state control and its decades of violence, and long-term repressed social energies began to emerge. This was perhaps the era of social movement. The aggregation of different social forces was gathered under the name of civil society, with, at their fore, the oppositional political (underground) coalition, using the social antagonism to fight for power under the rhetoric of democracy. The so-called 'political democratization' ended up following the US model of party politics, and electorate democracy of a formalistic type, usually exploiting

long-term ethnic and regional divides.<sup>24</sup> With the overturn of the political regime, the political realignment between the capital sector and what used to be oppositional forces in the civil society, in struggle over state power, has become the dominant power. Class politics dissolved into the background of the political scene. A proper capitalist society is now in shape, if not yet in its ideological readjustment, which partly explains why state power in these countries is still strong: the state used to control and also 'take care of' everything, and now the oppositionals are in power, and should do a better job. After a decade of turmoil and transition, radical social energies are by now either exhausted or co-opted into political systems. One often hears talk of the disappearance of social movements, and that the only possibility for further change lies in 'parliamentary democracy'.

It is in this conjuncture that Muto Ichiyo's 'Alliance of Hope and challenges of global democracy' (Chapter 18) tells a different story: the social movement has not finished and in fact has just begun. An internationally respected activist scholar for the past forty years, Muto Ichiyo proposes a paradigmatic shift in global politics: a non-statist, people-to-people centered politics of a 'transborder participatory democracy'. The dominant model for oppositional politics, a struggle for taking over state power as the ultimate political agenda, has to be re-examined. Muto's proposal, to be sure, is not one based on anarchism, but stresses the need to bypass state power so as to widen global social spaces for subject groups to exercise their own power. State bureaucracy is definitely needed to run day-to-day public work, such as transportation, water supply, etc. As Muto strongly states, 'It is this global structure [of domination] that we face and are called upon to transform. For without disintegrating the global power center and replacing it with an alternative governance of the people we can hardly hope to ensure the survival of human kind, hand down a life-giving environment to the coming generations on this planet, let alone overcome the immense gap between the rich and poor in the world.' How to implement the project? There is no definitive answer. But an attempt to construct such a model has already taken place. The PP21 (the People's Plan for the twenty-first Century) project was inaugurated in 1989, in Japan. Three hundred and sixty activists from Asia, the Pacific and other continents met with thousands of Japanese activists to formulate long-term plans. The second round took place in Thailand, in 1992; and prior to that, people's movement representatives from six Central American countries met in Managua with a Japanese PP21 group under the aegis of the newly-organized PP21 Central America.<sup>25</sup> In 1996, the third convergence took place in Nepal. It was in these gatherings that the new concept of 'transborder participatory democracy' was put forward, with the people of the world as the constituency. Muto recalls, 'It is a permanent democratization process based in "democracy on the spot" – emancipatory transformation of everyday relationships in the family, community, work place and other institutions of life – extending beyond social, cultural, and state barriers, and reaching, influencing and ultimately controlling the global

decision-making mechanisms wherever they are located.' We should not over-romanticize the PP21 project. It has its own problems: it attempts to cover too much, with limited resources and organizing power. But this is one of the few ideal visions available to those who are aiming to change the world, and indeed, the ideal has been put into practice. The optimism of the project is, to my reading, based on a desire to change, an impossible hope to link hopes together; to use Muto's term, 'the alliance of hope' to construct an 'international civil society' to prevent the over-expansion and over-power of the state and capital. The challenge is more than immense. 'This is the challenge we need to take. It is indeed a profound change that we need to work. But that we have gathered here in this Encounter is proof enough that the march has begun.'

With the spirit set by the exemplary project PP21, it is at this moment of temporary narrative closure that we come back to the historical unifying forces of an open-ended Marxism, a Marxism without guarantee, to recycle Stuart Hall's widely circulated phrase. This book ends with Naoki Sakai's dialogues with Stuart Hall, conducted in Tokyo, during the 1996 conference on 'Dialogues with cultural studies', organized by the Institute of Information and Communication Studies, University of Tokyo, through the endless effort of Professor Tatsuro Hanada. In this encounter of historical instance, cultural studies in England (or more precisely, the legacy of a Birmingham version), the new left of cultural studies was put in the spotlight to 'converge' with its counterpart in Asia: the Marxist tradition in Japan. In reading the interview, I was forced to realize that perhaps the most established and influential tradition of Marxism is no longer in its originating space – Europe, but in other geographical sites such as Japan. Marxism in Japan is not only occupying the center space of Japanese academies, but is still a lively influence on Japanese culture and society. There is a Gramsci society in Kyoto, Althusserian Marxism in Tokyo, cultural studies groupings in Fukuoka, Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto, Tokyo, and prominent journals such as *Thought*, *Modern Thought*, *Critical Space* and the highly acclaimed activist journal, *IMPACTION* which links cultural studies with social movement sectors, and book series published by the publisher, Iwanami (not to mention the long-term translation tradition, e.g. an anthology of the *New Left Review* was published in 1964, when the journal started only in 1960), to continue a Marxist line of thought.

The critical point to stress here is not so much the fact that Europe no longer has the copyright over Marxism, since it is everywhere, and more lively than its European counterpart, but that, as I argued earlier, Marxism, as a symbolic sign to reconnect different geographical sites, different intellectual traditions, and political practices, has to be reclaimed to perform its historical mission in linking critical energies together and in charting out directions to converge for the future. This is where cultural studies practitioners and social movement activists could take on the political and intellectual responsibility to move forward in fulfilling the incomplete project of decolonization.

## Notes

- 1 Other papers first delivered in the conferences already published elsewhere have to be excluded here. See Preface, note 1. The fact, that these 'other' papers are mostly generated outside English-speaking contexts, says something about the global knowledge production system.
- 2 I am appropriating Chris Connery's (1996) formulation of the 'oceanic feeling' here.
- 3 See the 'Declaration of the People's Conference Against Imperialist Globalization', 23 November 1995, Manila.
- 4 For specifics, see Chen (1996).
- 5 An 'empirical' study is ongoing, under the title, 'Diasporic Opportunism, Native Collaborationism'. The former term refers to those who reside in the imperial center space: not only selling their pc (multicultural) identity, they monopolize speaking positions to block voices coming from 'home'; and the latter points to those 'returnees' from the neocolonial empire, who have clearly projected a desire to 'return' to the center: they become native informant (drawing on theories produced in the empire, partly enunciated by the diasporic opportunists), to 'report' local information, and become academic brokers in collaboration with the center powers, diasporic or otherwise, left or right.
- 6 See for instance, the recent publication of eight volumes of *Modern Japan and Its Colonies*, released by Iwanami publisher (Tokyo), 1993.
- 7 Given the limited space here, I could not escape from a reductive account of these forms. For details, see Kuan-Hsing Chen (forthcoming).
- 8 See Césaire (1950/72: 39-43). For instance, 'If you criticize the colonialism that drives the most peaceable populations to despair, Mannoni will explain to you that after all, the ones responsible are not the colonialist whites but the colonized Madagascans. Damn it all, they took the whites for gods and expected of them everything one expects of the divinity' (p. 41).
- 9 One could perhaps argue that *Black Skin, White Masks* was written in response to Mannoni. Chapter Four, 'The So-Called Dependency Complex of Colonized Peoples', begins with a citation of Césaire and then goes on to attack Mannoni.
- 10 Nandy puts it, 'The broad psychological contours of colonialism are now known. Thanks to sensitive writers like Octave Mannoni, Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi we even know something about the interpersonal patterns which constituted the colonial situation, particularly in Africa. Less well known are the cultural and psychological pathologies produced by colonization in the colonizing societies' (*The Intimate Enemy*, 1983: 30). Then he goes on to analyze India.
- 11 For detailed analysis on Nandy and Huntington, see Kuan-Hsing Chen (forthcoming).
- 12 For a detailed account, see Chen (forthcoming).
- 13 See for instance, Wang (1995), an edited volume in response to Huntington. Moreover, he was invited to Singapore and Malaysia to debate with 'Asian' scholars in September 1997.
- 14 The work of Professor Renato Constantino, who has published over forty books, cannot be summarized here.
- 15 See Hsu Tsung-mau (1996), 'The Clash of Civilization vs. the China Threat: A Report on the Debate between Huntington and the Singaporean and Malaysian scholars reflecting the Differences of Perceptions of the East and West,' *China Times*, September 17, page 9, for the report.
- 16 See for instance, Mahathir Mohamad (1995), 'Alliances and collaborations within the Pacific Rim,' in *The Pacific Rim in the 21st Century: Alliances and Collaborations in the Asia-Pacific* (Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute); Jiang's recent adoption of the key term, postcolonialism, see Kuan-Hsing



- Chen, 'Missile Internationalism', presented at the 'Salon de Refuse: Internationalism and Asian Studies', organized by Sakai Naoki and Tani Barlow, Hawaii, April 1996.
- 17 The question was raised by Lii's respondent, Masao Miyoshi, in the conference context. Whereas Lii sees the phenomenon signal a rupture, Miyoshi tends to take this mode of articulation more as a strategic maneuvering of transnational capital.
  - 18 For an interesting account of the Japan-Australia relationship before the end of World War Two, see Frei (1991).
  - 19 Strangely enough, if one re-evokes that tradition of necessary connection in history, one can often be charged with being a Leninist or Stalinist.
  - 20 The strong linkage between academic knowledge production and social activism has been firmly established in the Philippines context. For decades, active connections with NGOs (non-governmental organizations) have been part of intellectual life on the university campus. A recent project, Shop Front, initiated in the University of Technology, Sydney, is one of the experiments directly linked to practitioners of cultural studies, to do research in response to various community groups.
  - 21 Manuel Castells, in a 1995 lecture, termed such a turn as 'Think locally, Act globally'.
  - 22 The 228 event happened in 1947 when the Nationalist army took over Taiwan from the hands of Japan. A massive number of local people (estimated at sixty thousand) were killed in the process. This episode of history had been suppressed until 1987, the end of martial law. In recent years, the state has been pressed to deal with the responsibility for the state violence.
  - 23 See for instance, Native People Address the the United Nations (1994). It is so obvious that 'native', the colonialist term, is still adopted by the colonial formation of the UN. UN is nothing but an alliance of state machines from which, for instance, Taiwan's aboriginals have always been excluded, for the simple reason that ROC is not part of the UN. But what do aboriginals have to do with the nation-state? It is obviously not the choice of aboriginals to live within the structure of the nation-state.
  - 24 In Korea, the political transformation is termed as 'from military regime to civilian government', where in Taiwan the mainstream rhetoric is 'from authoritarianism to democracy'; the difference in formulation echoes the long term established critical tradition in the former context.
  - 25 For detailed documentation of these events, see People's Plan for the 21st Century (1996).

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