Anti-definiteness Effects and Non-Categorical Judgments

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Abstract
The definiteness effect (DE) in existential sentences has been widely studied since Milsark’s (1974) formal dichotomy of weak and strong quantifiers, the latter of which are prohibited in there sentences, as well as their counterparts in Mandarin you existential sentences (e.g. by Li & Thompson 1981; Huang 1987, among many others). It has also been observed, however, that definite expressions can occur in the existential sentences as well, e.g. the anti-DE in English existentials discussed from the pragmatic or semantic views by Ziv (1982), Prince (1992), Abbott (1993, 1997), Ward and Birner (1995), as well as the references cited therein. The anti-DE in Mandarin has been explored by Li’s (1996) syntactic account, and other pragmatic accounts, such as Hu & Pan (2002), Chang (2004), and Sie (2007). This paper aims to first re-examine the anti-DE from an interface perspective of mapping cognitive-semantic judgment types to syntactic representations. Then it proposes the structures of representing thetic or quantificational sentences that license the occurrences of the anti-DE. This new syntactic account does not preclude contextual information that licenses the anti-DE. Ultimately an interface among syntax, semantics and pragmatics is called for.

Keywords: (anti-)definiteness effect, existential construction, categorical judgment, thetic sentence, topic-comment predication
INTRODUCTION

The definiteness effect in existential *there* sentences has been widely acknowledged and discussed since Milsark’s (1974, 1977) dichotomy of weak and strong quantifiers. The former (such as *a*, *some*, *many*, or cardinal number determiners, plural and mass determiners) can occur in existential sentences, as illustrated in (1). However, noun phrases with the definite determiner *the*, demonstratives *this*, *that*, or pronouns, possessive determiners, and strong quantifiers like *every* and *most*, are prohibited in existential *there* sentences, as shown in (2).

(1)  
   a. There is a dog/ are some dogs in the room.  
   b. There are/is a school and two hospitals in Roxbury.  Milsark (1974: 33)

(2)  
   a. *There is {the dog/ John’s dog/ that dog/ him/ he} in the room.  

Although the definiteness effect (DE), considered as a “Universality Restriction” by Milsark, and its distinction of weak/strong determiners has been widely acknowledged (e.g., syntactic accounts of Reuland 1983; Safir 1982, 1987), yet linguistic data, such as in (3) and (4), do allow definite noun phrases to occur in existential sentences, thus complicating the paradigm.

(3)  
   a. Nobody around here is worth talking to… well, there is John the salesman.  
      (Belletti 1988: 15)
   b. A: I guess we’ve called everybody.  
      B: No, there’s still Mary and John.  
      (Abbott 1993: 42)
There have been a number of approaches to the theory of the anti-DE. These are syntactic (Belletti 1988; Li 1996), semantic (Rando and Napoli 1978; Holmback 1984; Ward and Birner 1995) or pragmatic (Abbott 1993; 1999) in nature, or a combination thereof. Although these approaches vary, yet two properties of the anti-DE in existential sentences have been largely agreed on. The first case of a DE violation occurs when the existential sentences are used to list entities as in (3); see Rando and Napoli 1978; Belletti 1988; Ward and Birner 1995, etc. In the second case, the anti-DE is possible if the NP/DP is uniquely identifiable as in (4); see Hawkins 1978; Holmback 1984; Belletti 1988; Ward and Birner 1995, etc. Particularly, in her pragmatic account, Abbott (1993) points out a difference in focus that can distinguish non-contextualised regular existential (NE) and anti-DE contextualized existential (CE) sentences. For the former type, the focus NP “typically has a locational or other predicative phrase following it, whereas proper names and anaphoric definites in CEs do not” (p. 43). Both types, however, still express discourse existence. Therefore, according to Abbott, the sentences in (5a) and (5b) are represented separately.

(5)  a. There’s [a book] [on the table]. (Abbott’s NE)

   b. There’s [the book on the table]. (Abbott’s CE)

Thus in the above (3b), the speaker draws “the addressee’s attention to the existence of Mary
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and John as filling the predicalional slot ‘people for us to call’” (Abbott 1993: 43). Likewise, *Mary and John* can be uniquely identifiable.

Although Abbott does not advocate a simple syntactic account but defends for a purely pragmatic contextual account, her observations deserve further investigation. Actually, her insight is addressed in Li’s formal account for Mandarin anti-DE cases. Before turning to Li’s account, let us first present some preliminaries of Mandarin DE and existential *you* ‘have’ sentences, in comparison with those in English. The DE is generally considered to be held in Mandarin Chinese, as shown by the contrast in (6). However, it has also been noted (Huang 1987; and Li 1996) that the DE is exempted when the subject of an existential verb *you* is lexically filled, such as by the location phrase in (7b).


    have people/one-CL/some people at room-in

    有人/一個人/一些人 在屋子裡

    ‘There are (some) people/is a person in the room.’


    have Lisi/he/every man/most man at room-in

    有 李四/他/每個人/大多數的人 在屋子裡

    ‘There is Lisi/him/everybody/most people in the room.’

(7)  a. *You naben shu zai tushuguan.

    have that-CL book at library

    有那本書在圖書館

    ‘There is that book in the library.’

    b. Tushuguan you naben shu.

    library have that-CL book
Li (1996) further notes that the existentials that allow definite noun phrases are possible only in sentential subject and adjunct clauses, such as *yaoshi*, *ruguo* ‘if’, *yinwei* ‘because’, *suiran* ‘even though’, *jiran* ‘now that’, *chufei* ‘unless’ as in (8), but not in matrix clauses or complement clauses embedded under the matrix verb, as in (9).

(8) *Ruguo* you *Zhangsan/nage* laoban lai, *women* jiu *keyi*  
if have *Zhangsan/that* boss come, we then can  
mashang *jiejue* wenti le  
immediately solve problem

如果有張三/那個老闆來，我們就可以馬上解決問題了  
‘If there is Zhangsan/that man coming, we can solve the problem right away.’  
(Li 1996:178)

(9) *Wo* renwei/xiangxin *you* *Zhangsan zai* zhaogu *Lisi*  
I think/believe have *Zhangsan at care Lisi*  

我認為/相信有張三在照顧李四  
‘I think/believe there is Zhangsan taking care of Lisi.’

Li proposes two structures to account for the regular existential sentences and the anti-DE counterparts. The DE is operative when the existence of a noun phrase (an individual or an entity) is asserted, as schematized in (10a), in which the NP is in the restriction of the existential operator *you*. In contrast, the DE is exempted when the event XP in the restriction of the existential operator is asserted as in (10b). Then the grammaticality of (8) is due to the
assertion of the VP in the adjunct clause, whereas asserting the subject proper noun in (11) is ungrammatical.

(10)  a. \([you\ NP\ [IP/CP\ XP]],\) exhibiting the regular DE

b. \([you\ [VP\ NP\ XP]],\) exhibiting no DE  (Li 1996: 176)

(11)  *You Zhangsan zai zhaogu Lisi.

have Zhangsan at care Lisi

有張三在照顧李四

‘There is Zhangsan taking care of Lisi.’  (Li 1996: 180)

Li’s syntactic analysis of (10) is reminiscent of Abbott’s insight of (5), in the sense that the DE is alleviated in cases when the coda XP is interpreted as a part of the NP. In contrast, the DE surfaces when the NP and the XP are not interpreted as a whole, (for example, when separated by a pause between them).

This present paper extends this line of thinking further and proposes a unified account for the above observations, in light of the cognitive-semantic modes of judgments developed in Kuroda (1972, 1992, 2003, and 2005). This paper specifically claims that the anti-DE becomes possible only when the existential sentence expresses a non-categorical judgment, namely a thetic or a quantificational description. Regular indefinite nominals do not posit problems for existentials. Definite nominals or strong quantifiers are possible in existentials only when they are not apprehended as a Subject (topic) of the logic Predication relation in expressing a categorical judgment.
KIND-DENOTING VS. EPISODIC PREDICATES

In a series of papers, Kuroda (1972, 1992, 2003, 2005) has systematically defended grammatical manifestations of logical “judgment forms” which date back to the philosophy of Franz Brentano (1874, 1924) and Anton Marty. “A judgment is meant to be a cognitive act… An utterance of a sentence… is said to represent the intentional object of the cognitive act it expresses” (Kuroda 1992: 20). Two judgment forms have been distinguished since Port-Royal grammarians: the thetic judgment and the categorical judgment. A thetic judgment is a single judgment form that simply expresses the recognition of the existence of an entity or a situation. A categorical judgment, however, consists of two judgments: the recognition of an entity (i.e., a “Subject” in the semantic rather than grammatical sense), and “the act of acknowledging or disavowing a Predicate of a Subject” (Kuroda 1992: 21). In (12), for example, may express a categorical judgment, which involves the cognitive act of apprehending a logical subject, termed as a “Subject” (the cat here) as being a substance and then attributing to it a certain property perceived in a situation, either being contextually referential or generic expression. In contrast, (13) can express a categorical judgment by virtue of recognizing the substance the cat as a Subject for the Predication judgment, or it may simply refer to a particular event either cognitively related to or perceived by the speaker without recognizing the Subject property. This simple recognition of the existence of a situation is a thetic judgment.

(12) The cat sleeps there.

(13) The cat is sleeping there.

As discussed in Kuroda (1992), English ambiguity of (13), with its two types of
possible judgments, is syntactically disambiguated by the use of –ga and –wa markers in Japanese. In (14), the ga marker on the bare noun neko ‘cat’ subject indicates a thetic judgment, whereas, in (15), the thematic wa-marked neko expresses a categorical judgment, a cognitive act of attributing to the specific entity neko the function it has in the situation of sleeping. For Kuroda, the intentional object of a categorical judgment is a Predication, and that of a thetic judgment a non-predicational description.

(14) neko ga asoko de nemutte iru. (thetic)

(15) neko wa asoko de nemutte iru. (categorical)

cat there sleeping be

‘the/a cat is sleeping there.’

Kuroda (2005) further distinguishes the thematic wa that expresses a topic from the contrastive wa (bold-faced). A thematic wa is perceived as the Subject of the predicative categorical judgment, which is allowed in his statement making context (SMC), including (i) a matrix context or an indirect speech context (IDSC), (ii) the complement to sitte iru ‘know’ and (iii) omotte iru ‘think’. Since a categorical judgment is an autonomous cognitive act of asserting, made by a “topic” wa sentence, it is an asserting statement in the SMC, a statement that asserts a “cognitive act of committing oneself to the truth of a conceived proposition and in its essence independent of another cognitive act or cognitive state” (Kuroda 2005: 26). In contrast with asserting, affirming is dependent on another cognitive act or state, the perceptual or conceptual apprehension of a situation. Consequently, a thetic judgment is a cognitive act dependent on a perception: it affirms what is given in perception. Only a contrastive wa (bold-faced) or a ga-marked subject is possible to occur in Kuroda’s termed “affirming” context; such as non-statement making context NSMC (and an IDSC).
(16) mosi Nomo ga/wa genki dattara, Dodgers ga katta daroo
    if well were won would

    ‘If Nomo had been well, Dodgers would have won.’ (Kuroda 2005: 17)

In short, a matrix context allows either a categorical or thetic judgment. However, a non-asserting (NSMC) context, such as the subordinate clause, does not grant the categorical utterance.

Returning to the existential construction, I show that the discussion of the DE and anti-DE in Chinese should take the above semantic judgments into consideration, to be detailed in sections 4 and 5. Before turning into Chinese, let us first re-examine how semantic judgments are relevant to English existentials. In addition to the issue of the (in)definiteness of the post-copular DP, Milsark (1974) has shown that the existential construction in (18) is ungrammatical, in which a predicate denotes a kind as a kind-level predicate (e.g. “individual-level predicate” ILP in Carlson’s (1977) term).

(17) There were people sick/drunken.

(18) *There were people intelligent/tall. (18)

Furthermore sentence (17) expresses a thetic/episodic perception, which is legitimate in the existential sentence, (cf. with its non-existential canonical sentence in (19), which is possible with categorical or thetic utterances). In contrast, predicates of (18) (intelligent/tall) attribute the predicate properties to the entity with substance (object in Ladusaw’s (2003) term) that is cognitively recognized. Since (18) calls for a categorical judgment (rendering either generic or categorical readings, e.g. in (20)), then it is incompatible with there non-predicational
Instead of relying on the distinction of individual-level and stage-level predicates, Kuroda (1992) argues that episodic (stage-level) predicates may denote genericity with a bare noun subject, giving rise to a categorical judgment, as evident by the choice of markers to apply to the English *cats* of (21). Japanese (22a) is a nontopicalized form containing a *ga*-marked bare noun subject that is focused. It is a thetic utterance: a recognition of an event of having some cats chasing mice. In contrast, a thematic *wa* marked *neko* in (22b) is perceived as a Subject contributing to a categorical judgment, possibly a generic or kind-denoting interpretation.

(19) People are sick/drunken. (categorical, thetic)

(20) People are intelligent/tall. (categorical or generic, *thetic*)

(21) Cats chase mice.

(22) a. Neko *ga* nezumi o oikakeru.
    cat    mice    chase

    b. Neko *wa* nezumi o oikakeru.
    cat    mice    chase

What is less explored in Kuroda’s work but concerns us here is the judgment form that arises from an indefinite numeral subject. According to Ladusaw (1994), (23) is ambiguous between a categorical (partitive, presuppositional reading) mode of predication and a thetic (nonpresuppositional, non-specific reading) mode of description.
In this paper, instead of following Ladusaw’s dichotomy, I distinguish this presuppositional specific reading of indefinites from a categorical sentence and classify it into a distinct construal, namely a quantificational sentence.¹ On the one hand, unlike the categorical Subject that makes references to the Subject property, the quantificational subject simply acknowledges (a) certain identifiable entity/entities without referring to its/their internal substance. On the other hand, unlike the thetic subject whose substance is not apprehended, the quantificational subject is contextually referential or specific, at least to the speaker.

DEFINITE NOMINALS IN ENGLISH EXISTENTIAL SENTENCES

As seen above, the DE alone cannot fully capture the full range of legitimate existentials. Further consideration of the judgment forms with eventuality types is called for. The existential sentence, as a non-state marking context (NSMC), affirms rather than asserts (in Kuroda’s terminology). Therefore, it is not compatible with categorical expressions, evidenced by the contrast in English (17) and (18).

(18) *There were people intelligent/tall.

Moreover, a definite noun that is perceived as a Subject attributed by the predicate cannot occur in existential (24) to express a categorical judgment, a context that has not been

¹ Kuroda (1992: 28) states that an indefinite noun phrase cannot be a Subject because it “has no semantic reference, but may have the speaker’s reference” (p. 75) in terms of Kripke’s (1979) distinction between Grice’s “speaker’s reference” and “semantic reference”. As noted by Huang (1987) following Prince (1992), definites here may be expressed as semantically indefinites though they are syntactic definite.
addressed in previous discussions of the anti-DE.

(24) *There is John who is intelligent.

In contrast to (24), the anti-DE cases discussed in the literature are largely non-categorical episodic sentences which lack the perceiving of a substance for the DP entity. The sentences that display anti-DE in the literature mainly affirm the existence of an episodic eventuality that contains at least a DP (3b), or a non-predicative proposition in (4).

(3)  b.  A: I guess we’ve called everybody.
    B: No, there’s still Mary and John.

   (Abbott 1993: 42)

(4)  a. There’s the book on the table.

   (Abbott 1993: 44)

b. There were both major political parties represented at the conference.

   (Holmback 1984, #35)

c. There is the village idiot at the front door. (Holmback 1984, #49b)

The occurrence of definite NPs in an existential is acceptable, provided that there is a special contextualization, such as the assertion of the existence of an item whose existence is presupposed (Abbott 1993). This line of thinking is in line with W&B’s (1995) categories of “hearer-old entities [with a] newly instantiated variable” and the commonly known list reading type mentioned above.

(25)  A: Who was at the party last night?
Moreover, it has been shown that the post-copular DP is focused or is uniquely identifiable, being equivalent to W&B’s “hearer-new entities with uniquely indentifying description[s]” in (26).

(26) a. There were both major political parties represented at the conference.
   (Holmback 1984, #35; W&B 1995: 726)

b. There is the village idiot at the front door.
   (Holmback 1984, #49b; W&B 1995: 726)

c. There is the perfect man for Mary in my 210 class. (Holmback 1984, ex. 25, from W&B 1995:732)

The definite noun phrase may be “hearer-old entities treated as hearer-new” in W&B’s (1995) cases, embracing the reminding cases in Abbott’s example of (3).

(27) There were those neighbors at the City Council meeting yesterday.
   (W&B 1995: 731)

In short, the above contextualized anti-DE sentences are legal in non-predicational construals: simply affirming the existence of the entity or recognizing an eventuality (containing identifiable entities). Data from our google search show episodic eventualities of the anti-DE existentials in NSMCs.
(28)  a. If there is the political will, the EU can meet its objective.\(^2\)

    b. If there is that "giant, basic, plan", it is at least possible that things that were
meant to be may occur in spite of things that were not meant to be, simply
because humans (or other Earthly factors) have not thrown off the whole plan,
but only isolated parts of it.\(^3\)

Having now observed such the episodic eventualities in existentials, regardless of
whether the post-copular DP is definite or indefinite, the following section demonstrates the
same condition also applies to Chinese you ‘have’ sentences.

**TWO YOU’S IN CHINESE MATRIX CONTEXTS**

It is known that the subject generally requires a definite nominal, and cannot be
followed by you ‘have’ in Chinese matrix contexts, Kuroda’s (2005) SMC. A categorical
judgment is easily rendered because, in uttering a definite subject as the Subject/topic, an
entity is usually contextually/conceptually referable and can then be predicated with the main
predicates. This holds either in Carlson’s and Kratzer’s individual level (ILP) (29a), or stage
level predicates (SLP) in (30a). But these predicational utterances are not intended in thetic
judgment types, so they are not possible in you sentences such as in (29b) and (30b), even
though (30b) has episodic predicates. In other words, in Chinese you cannot immediately
precede a definite subject in matrix contexts (cf. previous English anti-DE there-definite DP
in (3) and (4) non-categorical sentences).


(29) a. Zhangsan hen congming./Gaizi shi shishang zui-youqian de ren.

張三很聰明/蓋茲是世界上最有錢的人

‘Zhangsan is smart./Gates is the richest person in the world.’

b. *You Zhangsan hen congming.4

‘*There is Zhangsan smart.’


張三/他們離開了/在看書/捉老鼠.

Zhangsan/they leave Asp/Prog. read-book catch mouse

‘Zhangsan/They left/is(are) reading books/catch(es) a mouse.’


*有張三/*有他們離開了/在看書/捉老鼠

YOU Zhangsan/YOU they leave Asp/Prog. read-book catch mouse

A bare noun subject is ambiguous between definite and indefinite readings. The former renders either the definite referential *cats* or a generic reference to the *cat* kind, as in (31a). This is an expression of a categorical judgment, which consequently precludes the appearance of *you*. In contrast, (31b) with *you* denotes a non-generic, non-topicalized specific utterance (the third type of quantificational judgment to be discussed below), or a non-specific indefinite entity subject, rendering a typical thetic judgment. Sentences with episodic eventualities in (32) illustrate parallel patterns.

(31) a. Xuesheng/Mao hen congming. --(categorical judgment: generic or referential)

student/cat very smart

4 Huang (1987) also notes that definite noun phrases cannot be preceded by *you* even in an individual-level predicate.

(i) You yige/*neige ren hen youqian 有一個/那個人很有錢

have one/that man very rich

‘There is a/*the man very rich.’ (Huang 1987:243, ex. 67)
‘Students/Cats are smart.’

學生/貓很聰明.

b. You xuesheng/mao hen congming. --(quantificational, or thetic description)

YOU student/cat very smart

有學生很聰明/有貓很聰明

(32) a. Xuesheng chi-dao/ Mao zhuo lao-shu.

student late./Cats catch mouse

‘Students are late./Cats catch mice.’

學生遲到/貓捉老鼠

b. You xuesheng chi-dao/ mao zhuo lao-shu

YOU student late/ cat catch mouse

有學生離開了/有貓捉老鼠

As for indefinite yi-N or numeral-N subjects, they have to be preceded by you. Similarly to the above indefinite bare nouns, the sentence may simply recognize an eventuality without recognizing the substance of the indefinites, rendering a thetic utterance with a non-presuppositional/referential indefinite as in (33b) and (34b). In addition, a presupposed specific indefinite is also possible-particularly in episodic predicates, being less acceptable in kind-denoting predicates.

(33) a. *Yi-ge ren hen congming/shi shi-shang zui you-qian de ren.

one-CL man very smart/BE world most rich Gen. man

*一個人很聰明/是世界上最有錢的人

b. You yi-ge ren hen congming/shi shi-shang zui you-qian de ren.

YOU one-CL man very smart/BE world most rich Gen. man
[有一個人]很聰明/是世界上最有钱的人
‘A man is smart/the richest man in the world.’

(34) a. ？Yi/San-ge ren li-kai le/zai kanshu/ zhuo laoshu
one/three CL man leave Asp/at read-book/catch mouse
‘A man/Three men left/is(are) reading/catching mice.’

？一/三個人離開了/在看書/捉老鼠
b. You yi/san-ge ren li-kai le/zai kanshu/ zhuo laoshu
有—/三個人離開了/在看書/捉老鼠

In short, I have outlined three possible readings of the subject nominals in relation to
the judgment types that the sentences may express. In the following, I propose three-layer
representations to derive the above interpretations. First, a non-presupposed and non-specific
indefinite (numeral or bare noun) subject is existentially closed by an existential operator,
surfacing as you situated at ν, in the spirit of Diesing’s (1992) Mapping Hypothesis and Tsai’s
(2001) revised version. This existentially closed sentence in (35) expresses a typical thetic
judgment, e.g., the indefinite, non-specific subject in (b) sentences from (31’) through (34’).
Note that the Spec,TP is left null due to the lack of an expletive subject in Chinese, e.g., Li

(35) Thetic expression

\[
\text{TP} \rightarrow \emptyset \rightarrow \nu P \rightarrow v^\prime \rightarrow \nu P \rightarrow v \rightarrow \nu \rightarrow \text{you} \rightarrow \text{yi-ge ren/mao} \rightarrow V^\prime \rightarrow \text{li-kai le}
\]
(31’) b. You xuesheng/mao hen congming. [有學生/貓很聰明]  
YOU student/cat very smart  
‘There are students who are smart.’

(32’) b. You xuesheng li-kai le/You mao zhuo laoshu.  
YOU student leave-Asp/You cat catch mouse  
‘There are students who left. There are cats that catch mice.’

[有學生離開了]/[有貓捉老鼠]

(33’) b. You yi-ge ren hen congming. [有一個人很聰明]  
YOU one-CL man very smart  
‘There is a man who is smart.’

(34’) b. You yi-ge ren li-kai le/zai kanshu/zhuo laoshu  
YOU one-CL man leave Asp/at read-book/catch mouse  
‘There is a man who left/is reading a book/is catching mice.’

[有一個人離開了/在看書/捉老鼠]

The second type (36) represents a quantificational utterance, in which the subject is a presuppositional and specific indefinite. Distinct from the typical categorical utterance, this quantificational sentence is assumed to host a contrastive subject, comparable with Kuroda’s contrastive wa, a focused –ga phrase, or with English specific indefinites in Ladusaw (1994). I further assume that Chinese you has been cliticized to the indefinite nominal to form a DP
(cf. partitive you in Tsai 2003) that moves to the Spec,TP position. The specific reading is thus rendered, yet it is not quantified as a genuine Subject/thematic topic as that in a categorical utterance. By contrast, a definite expression landed in Spec,TP is construed as a specific individual related to the perceived eventuality; it is focused, but it is not perceived by the speaker as a recognized substance, e.g. a variant reading of (29a) and (30a), and the following (b) sentences from (31’’) through (34’’).

(36) Quantificational description

(31’’)b. You xuesheng/mao hen congming.
   YOU student/cat very smart.
   ‘There are students/cat that are smart.’
   [有學生/貓][很聰明]

(32’’)b. You xuesheng li-kai le/You mao zhuo laoshu.
   YOU student leave-Asp/YOU cat catch mouse
   ‘There are students who left./There are cats that catch mice.’
   [有學生][離開了]/[有貓][捉老鼠]

5 Chinese indefinites cannot be solely raised to the Spec,TP. According to Li (1998) and following Longobardi (1994), the D position of an indefinite DP should be licensed by an OP, you here, to exempt from the Empty Category Principle violation.
In other words, sentences (31b), (32b), (33b) and (34b) are ambiguous between the thetic reading, represented by (35), and the quantificational reading as in (36). In the former, you functions as an existential operator that binds an event variable that is constituted with the subject and the predicate. In the latter, you, having been cliticized (grammaticalized) to the indefinite nominal (cf. Tsai 2003), functions as a pronominal determiner and only quantifies over the indefinite nominal.\(^6\)

A categorical reading (37) is construed when a referential definite or a bare nominal lands at the Spec,TopicP position to be the perceived entity, as the Subject feeding the

\(^6\) The quantificational reading of the indefinite subject in Mandarin may not be made parallel with that in Japanese, as pointed out by Hiroshi Aoyagi (personal communication 2012). As noted by Kuno (1973), gakusei in (i), if it is taken as indefinite, is obligatorily focused, but if it is interpreted as quantificational, it is construed as generic.

(i) (#)gakusei-ga soomei-da.

student-nom smart-cop

‘Students are smart.’

Moreover, Aoyagi further notes that when ar-u ‘be-adnominal’, Chinese you equivalent, appears as in (ii), the subject renders an exhaustive-listing (obligatory focus) reading in Kuno’s terms. He further states that (ii) does not express a thetic judgment, though it might be that of a quantificational judgment in the sense of Kuroda.

(ii) (#)aru gakusei-ga soomei-da.

certain student-nom smart cop

‘A certain/some students are smart.’ Or ‘Certain/some student’s are smart.’

When it comes to Chinese counterparts, it is not clear whether the subject focus is obligatorily rendered or readily perceivable. However, a thetic judgment, as represented in (35), expresses a sentence focus, affirming the existence of an eventuality. And the quantificational reading in (36) affirms the existence of the entities denoted by the subject, which may feed the subject focus reading.
categorical Predication. Consequently, the Topic position licenses the thematic topic of the definite expression or generic bare noun. The raising to TopicP is possible only when there is no you that existentially closes the predicate.

(37)

(29) a. Zhangsan hen congming. [張三][很聰明]

Zhangsan very smart

‘Zhangsan is smart.’

(30) a. Zhangsan/Tamen li-kai le/zai kanshu/zhuo lao shu

Zhangsan/they leave-Asp/at read-book/catching mouse

‘Zhangsan/They left/was(were) reading books/catching mice.’

張三/他們離開了/在看書/捉老鼠.

(31) a. Xuesheng hen congming. [學生/貓][很聰明]

student/cat very smart

‘Students/Cats are smart.’

Having laid out the three structures, it is predicted that structure (37) representing a categorical sentence is possible only in an SMC. It then follows that the NSMCs are
compatible with the above non-categorical construes: the thetic (35) and the quantificational (36) ones, which are licensed in \( you \) sentences.

**THE ANTI-DE IN NON-STATEMENT MAKING CONTEXTS**

Following the general assumption that \( you \) serves an existential operator, this paper claims that \( you \) affirms either the existence of an entity or an eventuality, compatible with the above thetic and quantificational sentences: a simple judgment of recognizing an eventuality. In this context, the DP or the whole eventuality may be focused while the coda predicate (if present) is not the asserted predicate for Predication. Thus, a non-categorical utterance fits the type of all focus sentences (Lambrecht 1994, Breul 2004, among many others).

This account correctly rules out (29b) and (30b), repeated below, since neither of the definite expressions can be existentially closed within \( VP \), nor can they be incorporated with \( you \) to raise to Spec,TP, assuming D head has been filled following Li (1998).

(29b)  *You Zhangsan hen congming/Gates shi shijieshang zui youqian de ren.

YOU Zhangsan very smart/Gates be world most rich Gen. man

‘*There is Zhangsan who is smart/*There is Gates who is the richest man.’

*有張三很聰明/*蓋茲是世界上最有錢的人

(30b)  *You Zhangsan/Tamen li-kai le/zai kanshu/zhuo laoshu

YOU Zhangsan/they leave-Asp/at read-book/catch mouse

‘*There is Zhangsan/There are they who left/was(were)

reading books/catching mice.’

*有張三/*有他們離開了/在看書/捉老鼠.
In short, we can generalize the above discussion into the following patterns. The pattern of (38a) expresses either a categorical sentence (i), equivalent to structure (37), or a quantificational one (ii), corresponding to structure (36). (38b) is represented by the structure of (36), and (38c) correspond to (35).

(38) a. [definite-NP] [VP]
   
   (i) categorical sentence: referential nominals, generic bare noun, subject in Spec,TopicP.
   
   (ii) Quantificational sentence: referential nominals, episodic predicates, in Spec,TP.

b. [you indefinite-NP] [VP]
   quantificational sentence: specific, presupposed indefinite subject, Spec,TP

c. you [indefinite-NP XP]
   thetic judgment, non-specific indefinite nominals, Spec,VP

Consequently, it is predicted that (38a-ii), (38b) and (38c) are compatible with NSMCs, the latter two of which naturally follow regular existential constraints, you followed by an indefinite nominal.

(39) a. ruguo/suiran [you indefinite-NP] [XP],… ~ (38b)

b. ruguo/suiran you [indefinite-NP XP],… ~ (38c)

The anti-DE embedded contexts are derived when the you in (36) is raised to T to be incorporated with an adverb like xinghao, ruguo, suiran subordinators. The definite DP can only raise to the Spec,vP to be in the scope of the embedded context. In this case, it renders a
quantificational expression, recognizing an eventuality containing a definite nominal without making reference to its inherent substance. Moreover, the definite DP does not function as a variable restricted by the existential operator; rather, what is restricted is an event variable. What is affirmed is the existence of the eventuality containing the participant.

(40) ruguo/suiran you [definite-NP VP] ~ (38a(ii))

(41) a. Xinghao you [Lu, Yan-xun ya-zhen],…nan-wang dui cai wei chu-ju
   Fortunately YOU Lu, Yan-xun anchor, man’s tennis team then not out
   ‘Fortunately there was Lu, Yan-xun serving as the anchor, our men’s tennis
ewn’t out’
  幸好有[盧彥勳壓陣],…男網隊才未出局。

b. Hai-hao you ta gen wo liao-liao, fouze wo kuai beng-kui
   Fortunately YOU he with me chat, otherwise I almost stressed-out
   ‘Fortunately there was he chatting with me; otherwise I would have burned out.’
   還好有他跟我聊聊，否則我快崩潰。

As mentioned above, the DE is alleviated when the subject position is lexically filled, such as by a location or temporal phrase in (42). This anti-DE can be explained by the current proposal in the sense that after the existential OP is merged with T head surfacing as a possession verb, the lexically filled subject plus the realized verb form a typical subject+predicate relation, corresponding to English (43). Therefore, no restriction to the postverbal elements is imposed, like regular post-verbal objects.

(42) a. Tushuguan you naben shu. = (7b)
   library have that-CL book
   ‘The library has that book.’
b. 事实上以前也有过这种情况，

c. A: 有一句话说的非常好，百善孝为先，万事钱为本哪！
    B: pro 有这一句吗？

(43)  The library has the book.

As mentioned above, the Chinese (38a-ii) is derived by moving the referential definite noun phrase to the Spec,vP while possibly leaving the Spec,TP null. English existential *there* sentences, however, require a lexically filled subject as in (44). Hence, in our proposed structure (45) for English, the mechanism of raising the DP (either a referential DP or an indefinite) to Spec,vP is similar to that in Chinese in the sense that both are interpreted to be specific. What differs between them is that in English the expletive *there* is inserted (due to the strong EPP nature in Chomsky) in the Spec,TP. A definite DP is possible only when it is raised from Spec,VP to Spec,vP. Presumably the anti-DE is made possible by appropriate pragmatic contexts, as summarized above. What remains intact is that these existentials prevent a categorical sentence, as predicted by my current proposal.

(44)  There is the book in the library.

(45)  An English *there* existential sentence

\[ \text{TP} \]

\[ \text{there} \]

\[ \text{T'} \]

\[ \text{be} \]

\[ \text{vP} \]

\[ \text{v'} \]

\[ \text{VP} \]

\[ \text{v'} \]

\[ \text{V'} \]

\[ \text{coming/chasing mice} \]
Turning back to the Chinese definite, in a NSMC without *you*, the referential DP ends as in the Spec,TP in (46a), represented in (36). When the proper noun is further topicalized to the matrix TopicP, it gives rise to sentences like (46b).\(^7\)

\[(46)\]

\begin{enumerate}
\item a. Ruguo/Suiran Zhangsan hen congming, ta jiu hui bangzhu bieren.
\begin{quote}
if/although Zhangsan very smart, he then will help others
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
如果/雖然張三很聰明，他就會幫助別人.
\end{quote}
‘If Zhangsan is smart, he will help others.’
\item b. Zhangsan ruguo/suiran hen congming,… 張三如果/雖然很聰明…
\begin{quote}
Zhangsan if/although very smart,…
\end{quote}
\end{enumerate}

By contrast, when *you* occurs in an NSMC, it is not possible to use a kind-denoting (ILP) predicate that tends to express a categorical predicative judgment, as shown by the ungrammatical (47a), and as correctly predicted by our previous account. In contrast, when the subordinate predicate denotes an episodic eventuality, sentence (48a) becomes grammatical, surfacing the so-called anti-DE case. Note that even though (48a) is allowed, *you*+Zhangsan cannot be a constituent to raise to the matrix Topic position as in (48b). This topicalization move, unlike that in the above (46b), is banned in our analysis since the intended categorical construe is not possible in *you* sentences.

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\(^7\) One may propose an existential operator that binds a Davidsonian eventuality argument, and the participants, Zhangsan and Lisi as constants, are not in the scope of the existential operator, as suggested by Hiroshi Aoyagi (p.c. 2012).

(i) \(\exists e \text{ take-care-of } (z, l, e)\)

(Int.) ‘There was an event in which Zhangsan took care of Lisi.’

I suggest that the existential operator binding an eventuality argument is licensed only when it is embedded in subordinate or non-categorical contexts; otherwise, we would wrongly allow cases like in (11). This line of thinking does not preclude the topic counterpart as in (46b), which contains a null subject within the subordinate clause and Zhangsan in the Topic position.
(47) a. ?*Ruguo you Zhangsan hen congming, women jiu bu-hui shu.
   if YOU Zhangsan very smart, we then not-will lose
   ‘If Zhangsan is smart, we wouldn’t have lost.’
   如果有張三很聰明,…

   b. *You Zhangsan ruguo hen congming, women jiu bu-hui shu.
      YOU Zhangsan if very smart, we then not-will lose
      *有張三如果/雖然很聰明…

(48) a. Ruguo you Zhangsan zai, women jiu hui ying.
   if YOU Zhangsan at-here, we then will win
   ‘If there is Zhangsan here, we would win.’
   如果有張三在,我們就會贏.

   b. *You Zhangsan ruguo zai, women jiu hui ying.
      YOU Zhangsan if at-here, we then will win
      *有張三如果/雖然在…

Further evidence comes from the impossibility of interpreting a generic bare noun in the existential NSMC, as shown in the ILP in (49) and in the episodic context in (50). The bare nouns cannot be rendered as generic, in contrast with the generic reading in the SMC in (31a) and (32a). Rather, they are only understood as indefinite, or marginally specific reading.

(49) Ruoguo you xuesheng/mao hen congming, jiu buhui mi-lu.
   if YOU student/cat very smart, then pro not-will go-astray
   ‘If there are students/cats that are smart, then we wouldn’t get lost.’
   如果有學生/有貓很聰明,就不會迷路.
We have shown that a definite nominal after English *there be* in (45) is possible when the DP is interpreted a specific subject and a non-categorical expression, provided by appropriate contextual information as previously mentioned. This account naturally accounts for Milsark’s observation that an ILP is not instantiated, even with an indefinite DP in an existential sentence that does not render a categorical judgment. In Chinese *you* sentences, the typical DE is exempted when there is either a lexically filled nominal subject (e.g. a location or a temporal phrase) or a contextually understood null subject. The legitimate anti-DE surfaces when the clause following *you* expresses a non-categorical judgment, which is possible in an NSMC. The simple recognition of an eventuality (possibly containing an identifiable, specific participant) naturally accounts for Abbott’s (5b) and Li’s (10b) observations, discussed above.

**CORPUS DATA**

This section presents further data that supports my analysis, based on the corpus data from Word Sketch, a database derived from the Balanced Corpus Academia Sinica, and also based on some examples discussed in Sie’s (2007) and Shyu and Sie’s (2008) data from the United Daily News Corpus; see Appendix for details.
A Null or Lexically Filled Subject in Possessive you Sentences

As mentioned above, the DE is exempted when there is a lexically filled pre-you subject, e.g. a temporal phrase in (51) or a location phrase in (52). It is also possible, however, for a null subject to be understood as an implicit subject, such as they in (51a) or we in (52). Either possibility can be predicted by my proposed account, in the sense that this type of clause exhibits a canonical (null) subject + possession you + object pattern. Therefore, strictly speaking, they do not constitute a true anti-DE case.

(51)  a. 有人認為大賣場的寵物用品品牌不似寵物用品專賣店豐富，基隆…
     店總經理張…並不認同。他說，過去的確有這種情形，現在已不一樣了，大賣場擴大相關商品貨架，甚至開闢專區。(S76)\(^8\)
     ‘Lit: He said that there was this situation in the past, but now everything is different.’

     b. 今天中午有行政院團隊「真堅定助選團」誓師大會；下午有蘇貞昌領銜的「改革進步助選團」亮相；傍晚又有謝長廷帶兵的「台灣長工助選團」啟航。(S104)

(52)  在漫長的旅途中如有巧遇，它帶來的驚豔比旅程本身更迷人，也更難忘懷。今夏的新疆行，在南部阿圖什市的一個午后，就有這樣一場美麗的邂逅。(S74)
     ‘Lit: …one afternoon in Artux city, there was this beautiful encounter.’

Listing Reading

\(^8\) The examples drawn from Sie’s (2007) thesis are marked indicating her original numbers.
There are sixteen “list reading” instances in Shyu and Sie’s (2008) data. The noun phrases that are juxtaposed may be preceded by *hai* ‘still’, as in (53), to draw the hearer’s attention to the added information. The definite noun phrase is not totally new in the discourse; rather it is a subset entity that is related to the set in the previous discourse.

(53) 而CONVERSE原價1,180元的帆布鞋，過去最便宜的黑白雙色特價690元，今天只賣590元。另外還有最受矚目的限量籃球鞋，一是喬丹的23代和當下最紅的詹姆斯大帝四代限量籃球鞋，訂價4,950元，特價4,500元，全店只有30來雙。購滿5,000元送耐吉精美手提袋等好禮。（S119）

‘…There is still the most attractive sneakers limited in stock: one is Jordan’s 23rd generation and the most popular James the Great, the 4th generation….’

The bracketed eventuality following *you* in (54), *Song’s criticizing others in his pep rally*, contrasts with and is juxtaposed with the previous event in the first conjunct, *Lian’s airline ticket being taken away by their opponents*.

(54) 先是國民黨替連戰訂的機位，意外被蘇貞昌「截走」，惹得連戰幕僚一肚子不滿；後有[宋楚瑜昨晚在造勢晚會暗批扁蘇配]，選戰火花從花蓮補選延燒到總統大選。（S98）

“….then there was Song, Chu-yu criticizing the unity of Mr. Chen and Mr. Su in his pep rally…”

What is listed is either an entity in (53) or an eventuality in (54); both types of which are compatible with thetic expressions: either affirming/recognizing the existence of an entity or an eventuality, (cf. with Li’s account, in which the former reading would not be predicted).
Although Li (1996) states that the definite existential type cannot occur as a matrix clause or as a complement clause of a verb such as *think, believe*, as in (9), there are forty-seven cases of this type in Shyu & Sie’s data—counting almost half of all of their anti-DE tokens (47 out of 97). Among the 47 *V-you* type, *faxian-you* ‘find-have’ counts up to almost half (21/47). In the twenty-one *faxian-you* cases, seventeen cases have a definite noun phrase following *you* (*faxian-you NP*), e.g. in (55-56), and only four examples show the *faxian-you NP+VP* pattern, as in (57-58). *You* is optional in these cases, but its occurrence emphasizes the existence of the entities or the eventualities, relevant information of which has been activated in previous discourse. Hence, the sentence expresses an affirming act by identifying its existence.

(55) 王金平…私下表示，如果去一趟中南部的基層，就會發現有這種聲 | | (55) Wang Jinping… privately said, if you visit southern-central Taiwan, you will find there is this kind of voice.

(56) 一名林姓工程師說，…有一天和太太到文化中心在散步發現有這種 | | (56) A Mr. Lin, an engineer, said, … one day when he was walking with his wife, he found there was this kind of massage store.

(57) 如果民眾今後發現有[這種集團出现在老人較多的地方企圖不軌]，請趕快報 | | (57) If the public later finds [this group appearing in places with many elderly people and attempting to act improperly], please report it to the police. 
‘(lit.) If people find there is this kind of gang appearing in the place with more elderly people and attempting to deceive them, please call the police as soon as possible.’

(58) 收容所人員說，要把專丢小狗給市府的飼主所有母狗結紮，還牽涉獸醫的權益，就發現有這種養狗人家進出高級轎車，但卻捨不得花小錢幫母狗結紮，該所也很困擾。 (S20)

‘(lit.) They find there is this kind of dog-raising family, driving high-class sedan, but being reluctant to spend money on the ligation for the dog.’

Definite nouns may occur after tingshuo you ‘hear-have’, nineteen instances in S&S’s data. Though these nouns can occur in the subordinate clause, as predicated by Li (1996), they can also occur in the matrix clause as the object in (59), a canonical VO structure. (60) is allowed in the current analysis, since tingshuo occurs in a NSMC, as an embedded thetic description of her husband accompanying her.

(59) 中鋼投資部門昨天表示，完全沒有聽說有這個評估案。 (S39)

(lit.) ‘They never heard that there is this evaluation case.’

(60) [商人聽說有她丈夫相伴]，這就不好意思不開門相見。 (S29)

(lit.) ‘The merchant heard that there was her husband keeping her company. They felt embarrassed and opened the door to meet them.’

There are eight instances of definite noun phrases following renwei you ‘think-have’ or fouren you ‘deny-have’ in the subordinate clauses within the S&S’s data.
(61) 卅五歲的陳姓男子前年五月騎車載楊姓女子發生車禍，楊女不幸死亡，陳指稱路旁突然竄出一隻黑狗，機車才會滑倒，檢方認定沒有這隻黑狗，依過失致死罪嫌起訴，但新竹地院調查認為有這隻黑狗，已判決無罪。(S72)

(lit.) ‘…the Hsinchu court investigated and thought that there was (because) this black dog, he was judged innocent.’

(62) 而小蕾也曾對朋友透露，因為和至翰太好，所以不走不行。關於小蕾，劉至翰沒否認有這人存在。(S70)

‘…As for Xiao-lei, Liu Zhihan didn’t deny that there is this person existing.’

This type strongly presupposes the existence of the entity or the eventuality following you. Therefore, filling in a definite noun phrase does not contradict the discourse information. Besides, the definite noun phrases express emphasis: the entity that the speaker aims to emphasize. Interestingly, an indefinite noun phrase does not seem to be acceptable in the above sentences. This suggests that the function of the definite noun phrases is to either reiterate or to make prominent the entity/eventuality that is related to the previous discourse, on a par with the ‘anaphoric’ property of the anti-DE mentioned by Abbott (1993).

Several instances of xinghao+you ‘fortunately-have’ were found in my Word Sketch search. They all fall into the embedded NSMC cases, since xinghao ‘fortunately’ is an adjunct introducing an adjunct clause. Either a proposition or a noun phrase may follow you.

(63) 幸好有[盧彥勳壓陣]，…中華男網隊才未…出局。

‘Fortunately there was Lu, Yan-xun serving as an anchor, so that the men’s tennis team was not out.’

(64) 幸好有[NP 教練的苦心勉勵]，她才咬緊牙關，衝破瓶頸。
'Fortunately there was the coach’s encouragement; she then could steel herself to endure the pain and have breakthroughs.'

**Superlatives**

As mentioned before, English allows superlatives in *there* existentials, as in (7) which is repeated below. While Hannay (1985) suggests a “remarkable” entity denotation, Lumsden (1983), however, claims that the sentences in (7) pattern with the ‘type’ reading, such as the most beautiful kind of sunset in (a).

(7)  

a. There was the most beautiful sunset this evening.  

(from Hannay, 1985:110, ex. 37)  

b. There was the ugliest looking woman reading the news tonight.  

(from Hannay, 1985:110, ex. 38)

Two typical superlative cases found in S&S’s Chinese data occur in *ji-shí* ‘even if’ clauses. The main clause assures the speaker’s assertion regardless of the extreme situation: hence the superlative form is used. The superlative noun phrases thus contribute to the focusing function.

(40) 主愛之家不是來者不拒，只接受願意接受挑戰的人，如果沒有決心，即使有[NP最好的戒毒環境]也無法幫上忙。(S78)  

‘Without determination, even if there is the best rehabilitation environment, it cannot help those who do not want to face the challenge of drug detoxification.’
CONCLUSION

In light of Kuroda’s syntactic manifestation of cognitive-semantic judgment types, this paper has articulated three structures representing categorical, quantificational and thetic sentences. It has also been shown that you existential sentences are licensed in clauses that express a thetic or quantificational judgment, but they are not used to express the predicational (categorical) judgment in a matrix clause (SMC). This syntactic-semantic licensing of the anti-DE does not preclude the contextual conditions previously discussed in the literature. Consequently, the study of the (anti-)DE interaction with existential sentences hinges on issues interfacing syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
REFERENCES


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APPENDIX

The data were drawn from 869,000 news articles of contemporary Mandarin Chinese from the United Daily News Corpus. From Shyu & Sie (2008), a summary of their 97 occurrences of the anti-DE cases is reproduced below, with both the clause types (main vs. subordinated) and nominal types (proper names, pronouns, demonstratives, universal quantifications, most-NPs, and superlatives) tallied.

Shyu and Sie’s (2008) classification of the definite noun phrases in you sentences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause Type</th>
<th>Modifier + bare Ns</th>
<th>Demonstrative + N</th>
<th>Proper Name</th>
<th>Pronoun</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
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<td>有 you</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NP+VP: 1</td>
<td>NP+VP: 3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>有最 you +superlative</td>
<td>NP: 2</td>
<td>NP+VP: 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>有大多數 you + most</td>
<td>Matrix: 8</td>
<td>Embedded:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>NP: 7</td>
<td>NP+VP: 6</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>還有 still + you</td>
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<td>NP: 9</td>
<td>NP+VP: 4</td>
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<td>發現有 discover+you</td>
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<td>NP+VP: 1</td>
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<td>NP+VP: 1</td>
<td>NP-VP: 6</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>因為有 because + you</td>
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<td>NP+VP: 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>如果/只要有 ifl only + you</td>
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Shu-ing Shyu